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## Contention One – Oil Dependence

**Plan’s key to supplement corn ethanol – most effective method to reduce oil dependence – superior efficiency, emissions, cost, potential, convenience to oil – other alternatives don’t solve**

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Note that the USA produces about 11% and consumes about 25% of world demand. Recent increases are attributable largely to growing economies in China, India, and other developing countries. At the current rate of worldwide oil consumption, the above worldwide oil reserves equate to about 44 years of production. Of course, total proved reserves includes both developed and undeveloped reserves, and a substantial portion of the total proved reserves have yet to be developed and produced. Such development and production will require considerable expenditures. For economic reasons, therefore, we have tended generally to have somewhere in the range of 10-15 years of developed and producing reserves at any time. Of course, we cannot accurately determine the amount of reserves present until they are developed and produced, but these estimates are developed using reasonable methodologies. What must be understood is that this does not mean we have 10 or 15 or 44 years before the oil runs out. The “peak oil” question must be addressed when new discoveries start to run out, but that has not been the case yet. However, at some point **the question of how long we can continue to rely on oil must be faced.** Given that the 44 years of reserves identified above represent what has been found with technology to date, and that **finding new reserves is becoming technologically more difficult and substantially more expensive, it is not unreasonable to infer from the above that the era of relatively cheap oil will be over** within something approaching 50 years, and therefore **we need to be migrating away from oil in earnest** by that time. **The problem with migrating away from oil is that it has proved to be very difficult to find a reasonable alternative to oil.** Sandalow has identified ten key facts about oil, each with an important implication, as follows (Sandalow, 2008): One reason that **oil** is so hard to replace is that it **is a relatively efficient energy source**. Cleveland, Costanza, Hall, and Kaufmann compared the “energy profit ratio” of various renewable and nonrenewable energy sources (Cleveland, et al, 1984), and Howard T. Odum compared the “energy yield ratio” (Odum, 1976). Their findings were summarized by Richard Heinberg (Heinberg, 2006, pp 162-164). **Oil has yield rates in the range of 8** to 11 and natural gas in the range of 7 to 10, with coal even higher. **Among alternatives,** only **sugar cane ethanol** (**8.3** to 10.2, per Goettemoeller, 2007), 100-year growth rainforest (12.0 per Odum), hydroelectric (11.2 per Cleveland and 10.0 per Odum), solar photovoltaics (1.7 to 10.0, per Cleveland), geothermal from hot dry rock (1.9 to 13.0 per Cleveland and 13.0 per Odum), and tidal electric with a 25-foot tide range (15.0 per Odum). The **fossil fuels** (oil, natural gas, coal) as a group **produce significantly higher energy profit ratios or energy yield ratios than do most green alternatives. This differential is typically reflected in price; we depend so heavily on oil, and to a lesser extent on other fossil fuels, because they provide more energy cheaper than do the currently available alternatives. One barrier to alternative energy sources is that the cost of those alternatives is higher than the cost of oil. However, the cost of oil is also rising. As time passes, we are still making significant discoveries** (such as Brazil’s finds in the Campos, Santos, and Espirito Santo basins) **and as prices rise so will oil supplies, as some known reservoirs are economically viable to produce only at higher prices. But we appear to have found most of the “easy” oil, and what is discovered in the future can reasonably be expected to be more expensive to produce.** Green, Jones, and Leiby, in a 1995 report prepared for the Office of Transportation Technology of the United States Department of Energy, forecasted that “in the long run the net price of oil (price minus marginal extraction costs) will rise steadily at the rate of interest” (Green, et al, 1995, p. 5). Since that time, **oil prices have fluctuated wildly but the overall trend is clearly upward.** The Energy Information Administration of the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE/EIA) prepares an annual energy report and forecast with projections of future energy supply and demand, specifically projecting supply and demand components for 2020 and 2030. The 2007 and 2009 forecasts (DOE/EIA, 2007 and DOE/EIA, 2009) can be compared as follows (reference case, volumes in quadrillion Btu/year): The 2009 forecast differs from the 2007 forecast primarily in that it considers the impact of the decline in energy consumption during the latter half of 2008. Although both forecasts predict an increase in domestic oil and gas production as well as energy from other source, both forecasts leave the U.S. very much dependent on foreign oil as far into the future as 2030. President Barack **Obama has stated, "And for the sake of our economy, our security, and the future of our planet, I will set a clear goal as president: In 10 years, we will finally end our dependence on oil from the Middle East** (Obama, 8/28/2008).” **Unfortunately, it does not appear that the energy program outline by President Obama will accomplish that goal. Efforts to develop wind, solar, and improved insulation for buildings will have minimal impacts on oil usage.** Perhaps the signature element—the electric automobile—is now coming into use, with a goal of 1 million on the road by 2015 (Obama, 1/25/2011). Assuming that each electric vehicle saves 4 gallons of gasoline per day, achieving that goal would reduce current oil consumption by about 200,000 barrels per day, or less than 1 percent. It is entirely likely that on the current path, the US will import more oil in 2015 than today, thus continuing the trend of the last 40 years of becoming ever more dependent on foreign oil. To date, the US has fallen far short of its intended goal of reducing its dependency on foreign oil. In fact that **dependency has increased** rather than decreased. It is the opinion of the authors that this results from three flaws in the US approach:  There has been a focus on developing a perfect solution in a laboratory environment and then implementing it, rather than making use of what is available.  Particularly with respect to oil, the perfect alternative has not been found, nor at this point is there any strong suggestion of what it might be.  **Regulations have hampered many private sector efforts to develop solutions. As a result the US finds itself in a position where it must address two potentially negative factors:  The era of cheap energy is coming to an end.  We currently have no good substitute**s **for oil.** THE APPROACH TAKEN BY BRAZIL **Brazil**, which was even more dependent on foreign oil than was the U.S. in the 1970s, **is today virtually energy-independent**. Because of transportation considerations and difficulties refining heavy oil, Brazil does import some oil, primarily from Bolivia (although that is expected to change once production in the offshore Campos, Santos, and Espirito Santo basins is up to speed), but it exports sufficient oil to be a net exporter of energy. Brazil is now among the ten largest suppliers of oil to the USA. Clearly, the Brazilian economy in general, and its energy consumption in particular, is significantly smaller than in the USA, so some lessons are not strictly applicable. However, **Brazil clearly did some things better than the U.S., and there are some broad general principles that have significant applicability. Brazil’s well-known and massive effort to develop alternatives to gasoline** (**sugar cane ethanol**) and diesel fuel (soybean-based biodiesel) **has replaced approximately 50% of gasoline** and 44% of the country’s on-the-road motor fuel. It should be noted that criticism that Brazil has destroyed the Amazon basin to produce ethanol is unfounded. Sugar cane is produced in the Brazilian states of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, Goias, Minas Gerais, Sao Paulo, Parana, Rio de Janeiro, Espirito Santo, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Alagoas, and Sergipe. The area with maximum potential for expansion lies in the states of Mato Grosso, Mato Grosso do Sul, and Goias. All these areas lie outside the Amazon basin (Lachlau, Sergio Andre, in Schwind, 2007). Further, it is estimated that approximately 65% of the area now producing sugar cane was converted from pasture land before. Brazil does also produce a significant amount of biodiesel, primarily from soybeans, and a considerable amount of soybean production does take place in areas that have been cleared in the Amazon basin. What may be less well known is that Brazil’s approach also included significant amounts of increased domestic exploration for oil and gas (the source of the other 56% of motor fuel) and hydroelectric (35% of Brazil’s total energy needs). Today Petrobras is perhaps the world’s leading center of expertise in deep water drilling. This has resulted in significant new finds in the offshore Santos, Campos and Espirito Santo basins. While Brazil’s recoverable reserves of oil and gas are less than those of the U.S., they are growing rapidly, and continued development could transform Brazil into one of the largest oil producers in the world (DOE/EIA, Brazil country brief, 2011). This emphasis on a broad frontal attack on the problem from all sources was accompanied by a strong bias in favor of action, specifically action utilizing known technology rather than waiting for future technologies to prove themselves. The ethanol plants are themselves relatively primitive, particularly when compared to a U.S. oil refinery (Schwind, 2007). Brazil has refused to become slave to “perfect” or to allow “perfect” to become the worst enemy of “good enough.” This is quite a contrast to the U.S. effort, where there has been considerable research into a “perfect” solution, but comparatively little effort to get “good enough” solutions implemented. Brazil’s approach also included a heavy orientation toward the private sector and free markets. Realizing that as a government-owned entity, Petrobras would likely be too bureaucratic and not sufficiently nimble to respond as needed, the government sold a large stake in the company and passed management duties and privileges to the non-government shareholders. Brazil moved further toward a free-market approach by ending Petrobras’s exclusive concession to develop all domestic oil and gas, and invited foreign companies to come in and take down exploration and production concessions. The mechanisms whereby sugar growers determine whether to sell there produce for making into sugar or into ethanol, and similarly the mechanisms whereby motorists decide whether to burn gasoline or ethanol in their autos (which are set up to burn either) rely almost entirely upon free-market principles. The sugar cane grower compares the prices he can receive at the sugar mill and at the ethanol plant before deciding where to sell his crop. Because automobiles and trucks are configured to run on either gasoline/diesel or ethanol/bio-diesel, the motorist can check the price of each, adjust for performance differential, and make a rational economic decision which one she should put into her vehicle today. Using sugar cane ethanol as the “swing” product introduces some price elasticity to both sugar and oil. While the sugar market is depressed today, lower sugar prices mean that farmers will deliver more sugar cane to the ethanol plant, and **ethanol prices give** some **insulation against oil**—and resulting gasoline—**price shocks.** The lessons to be learned from the Brazilian experience may be summarized as follows: Table 8 United States Of America Brazil The U.S. has debated the question of “drill here, drill now” versus alternatives versus conservation. The emphasis has been on debate and discussion rather than action. Brazil pursued all available options vigorously and simultaneously. The Brazilian approach has been “drill here, drill now” plus alternatives plus conservation. There has been a strong bias toward action. The U.S. has focused upon developing the “perfect” solution in the laboratory and then bringing that solution to reality. Brazil utilized existing technology to the maximum extent possible, and phased in improved technologies as they make the transition from laboratory to real world usefulness. Brazil has vigorously avoided letting “perfect” get in the way of “good enough”. The U.S. government has maintained an adversarial stance toward the energy industry, and has sought to regulate its activities heavily. Brazil has pushed toward a more cooperative approach with the energy industry, and generally allowed the free market to work. APPLYING THE LESSONS FROM BRAZIL TO THE UNITED STATES These **lessons learned from Brazil can be applied to address the USA’s energy problems.** Conservation, alternatives, and increased production from conventional domestic sources must be accompanied by vigorous research and development effort. Rather than wait for perfect technology to be developed, the timing is such that we need to implement some “good enough” steps today. Participation by the private sector in an energy market that sends the right price signals is the fastest way to make real progress; this requires a more cooperative, rather than adversarial, relationship with government, and efforts to ensure that free markets send the proper economic signals. The good news is that a solution appears possible. The bad news is that it will not be cheap. The era of cheap energy is over. Pursuing All Available Options Pursuing all available options means that conservation, alternative fuels, and increased production of domestic fuel—fossil and non-fossil—must be accomplished vigorously and simultaneously. Conservation The potential to “find” energy by saving it through conservation is enormous. The USA currently consumes 68.672 barrels of oil per day per 1,000 people, compared to Europe’s 29.42 barrels of oil per day per 1,000 people. Of particular note is that several European countries are able to maintain GDP per capita at, near, or above US levels, with significantly lower energy consumption: Admittedly, Europe has some advantages over the USA, which enable Europeans to use less energy:  Europe is more compact, with less distance between population centers.  Europe has generally better rail and public transit systems.  European homes are generally much smaller, requiring less energy to heat and cool.  Because Europe is so much further north, European summers are cooler, requiring less air conditioning, but this is offset somewhat because European winters are generally cooler, requiring more energy to heat. At the same time, these data suggest considerable potential for improvement. If the USA reduced its oil consumption to European levels, it would require no imports of oil from sources outside NAFTA. More realistically, a report prepared in 2005 for the Natural Resources Defense Council suggested that the United States could save an average of 2.5 million barrels per day by 2015 (Bordetsky, 2005). The proposed approach includes:  Providing tax incentives to auto manufacturers to retool to build more energy-efficient vehicles  Increasing the Corporate Adjusted Fuel Economy (CAFÉ) standards  Requiring replacement tires and motor oil to be at least as fuel efficient as original equipment tires and motor oil;  Requiring efficiency improvements in heavy-duty trucks;  Supporting smart growth and better transportation choices.  Expanding industrial efficiency programs to focus on oil use reduction and adopting standards for petroleum heating;  Replacing chemical feedstocks with bioproducts through research and development and government procurement of bioproducts; Upgrading air traffic management systems so aircraft follow the most-efficient routes; and  Promoting residential energy savings with a focus on oil-heat. Conservative commentator Charles Krauthammer has proposed a revenue-neutral consumption tax on gasoline to encourage conservation (Krauthammer, 2009). The principle behind this proposal is that a substantial tax be added to the price of motor fuel, with an offsetting reduction in the payroll tax. A driver who drove a lesser number of miles, or utilized a more fuel-efficient vehicle, than the standard would realize a net income from this approach. A variation of this approach is that revenue neutrality should apply to a majority of the tax, with the remainder comprising a net revenue stream that could be used to fund alternatives or research or infrastructure to reduce the use of oil. The savings resulting from the imposition of such a tax are not easily quantifiable, but reductions in consumption in response to the 2008 price spike would suggest that this could save at least 1 million barrels a day. **Alternatives** In the long run, the development of green energy technology **will make the biggest difference in** reducing or **eliminating** our **dependence** up**on** foreign, and even domestic, **oil.** The United States’ energy policy needs a more forceful approach to making alternative energy sources mainstream (Toal, 2008). **Oil** is a natural resource and **will deplete** in time and as the problem of global warming becomes more severe, the need for alternative fuel becomes more and more imperative (Luchansky & Monks, 2009). Unfortunately, in the short run all alternative fuels suffer from two basic shortcomings:  Because the vast majority of oil is used for transportation, translating alternative energy into an alternative for oil is a difficult proposition.  Alternatives compare poorly to traditional energy sources in at least one of the following areas: o Scale o Infrastructure o Price The relevant question, as stated by Richard Heinberg, ultimately becomes, “To what degree can any given non-petroleum energy source, or combination of sources enable industrial civilization to survive the end of oil?” (Heinberg, 2006, p.138) Heinberg further notes that the advantages of oil as an energy commodity, and by implication the disadvantages of alternatives, are that oil is:  Easily transported (liquid fuels are more easily transported than solids such as coal or gases such as methane, and may be carried in ships far more easily than can be gases);  Energy-dense (gasoline contains roughly 40 kilowatt-hours per gallon);  Capable of being refined into several fuels (including gasoline, kerosene, and diesel fuel) suitable for a variety of applications; and  Suitable for a variety of uses (including transportation, heating, and the production of chemicals and other materials) Because of the above limitations, the use of alternatives must be managed very carefully to obtain maximum advantage. As noted above, Brazil gets 50% of its “gasoline” and over 40% of its motor fuels from Biofuels. An equivalent ratio here would mean somewhere between 5 and 6 million barrels per day from Biofuels. That level is clearly achievable, with relatively inexpensive modifications to automobiles to enable flex fuel operations. The US currently gets about 1 million barrels a day from **corn ethanol**, and **further growth expectations for that market are limited. The quickest possibility of a material impact** probably **lies with sugarcane ethanol from Latin America.** Estimates are that as much as **10% of world gasoline usage could be replaced with sugar cane ethanol using current technology** (Goldemberg, 2007). Ron **Soligo** has **estimated the potential** for sugar cane ethanol from Latin America **to be** 2.5 to **3 million barrels per day**, depending on amount of land dedicated and yields obtained (Soligo and Jaffe, 2008). **If** the **trade sanctions with Cuba were lifted,** Juan Tomás Sanchez of the Association for the Study of the Cuban Economy estimates that **Cuba** alone **could supply** up to **3.2 billion gallons of ethanol annually** (200,000 barrels/day, or 1% of total U.S. energy consumption), while Cuba expert Jorge Hernandez Fonseca projects a more modest production figure around 2 billion gallons per year (Elledge, 2009). The difficulty arises because the current sanctions make the acquisition of accurate information more difficult. Since Cuban sugar production has declined from 44 million tons/year in 1950 to 11 million tons/year today (Zuurbier, 2008), significant upside potential is obvious. These impacts are substantially larger than any other steps under consideration, except perhaps the “drill here, drill now” option. We would still be **importing, but it would be from countries that are closer and have more in common than areas in the Middle East and elsewhere in the third world. The existence of a new cash crop in Latin America could dramatically improve their economies, reducing the pressure from illegal immigration, and could also provide farmers with an alternative to marijuana, cocaine, and other plants that are the source of many drugs currently being smuggled into the U.S. Moreover, the ability to use ethanol as a substitute for gasoline would introduce** at least some **elasticity** in**to** the gasoline **consumption** model, there**by limiting the exposure to oil price shocks in the future.** The EPA estimates that use of **sugar cane ethanol could reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions by 61%**, compared to 21% for corn ethanol (EPA, 2011). Additional ethanol supplies could be obtained from domestic sugar cane and sugar beets. Estimating the potential production from these sources is difficult, but perhaps another 500,000 barrels per day would be possible. That would mean a total of 4 million barrels per day from ethanol, slightly less than the 40% number, but a significant reduction in oil consumption. Additionally, **this would enable** the installation of significant **ethanol infrastructure now, to be in place** already **when** more exotic **forms of ethanol, like cellulosic, become commercially viable.** Incurring those **costs now would** actually **reduce the commercial viability threshold for the exotic sources of ethanol, as they become available.** The arguments against importing ethanol to add to domestic production center around the negative point that the US would still be importing. However, several counter-arguments should be kept in mind:  The proposed approach makes full use of domestic ethanol production capability, so **no domestic enterprise is harmed.**  Importing from Central America, the Caribbean, and South America places our energy supplies in far less jeopardy than importing from Asia and Africa.  The development of an additional lucrative cash crop would aid Latin American economies; in addition to being a good neighbor, the US should also see some relief with its drug and immigration issues along its southern border.  **Ethanol would be the first true alternative to oil**, and having it developed commercially in sufficient volumes would offer some elasticity to the oil-pricing problem, and provide some leverage against oil price spikes.

**2008 proves high oil prices discourage consumer spending and cause inflation – cheap alt energy is key to prevent global economic collapse and promote growth**

**Rubin, 12** (Jeff Rubin is a Canadian economist and author. He is a former chief economist at CIBC World Markets. Rubin had worked at CIBC World Markets and its predecessors since 1988, and served as chief economist from 1992 to 2009, “How High Oil Prices Will Permanently Cap Economic Growth,” <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-09-23/how-high-oil-prices-will-permanently-cap-economic-growth.html>, Sep 23, 2012)

**For most of the last century, cheap oil powered global economic growth. But in the last decade, the price of oil has quadrupled, and that shift will permanently shackle the growth potential of the world’s economies. The countries guzzling the most oil are taking the biggest hits to potential economic growth. That’s sobering news for the U.S., which consumes almost a fifth of the oil used in the world every day. Not long ago, when oil was $20 a barrel, the U.S. was the locomotive of global economic growth;** the federal government was running budget surpluses; the jobless rate at the beginning of the last decade was at a 40-year low. **Now, growth is stalled, the** [**deficit**](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/FDEBOGDP:IND) **is more than $1 trillion** and almost 13 million Americans are unemployed. **And the U.S. isn’t the only country getting squeezed. From Europe to** [**Japan**](http://topics.bloomberg.com/japan/)**, governments are struggling to restore growth. But the economic remedies being used are doing more harm than good, based as they are on a fundamental belief that economic growth can return to its former strength. Central bankers and policy makers have fail**ed **to** fully **recognize the suffocating impact of $100**-a-barrel **oil.** Running huge budget deficits and keeping borrowing costs at record lows are only compounding current problems. **These policies cannot be long-term substitutes for cheap oil because an economy can’t grow if it can no longer afford to burn the fuel on which it runs.** The end of growth means governments will need to radically change how economies are managed. Fiscal and monetary policies need to be recalibrated to account for slower potential growth rates. **Energy Source Oil provides more than a third of the energy we use on the planet every day, more than any other energy source. And you can draw a straight line between oil consumption and gross-domestic- product growth. The more oil we burn, the faster the global economy grows. On average over the last four decades, a 1 percent bump in world oil consumption has led to a 2 percent increase in global GDP. That means if GDP increased 4 percent a year -- as it often did before the 2008 recession -- oil consumption was increasing by 2 percent a year. At $20 a barrel, increasing annual oil consumption by 2 percent seems reasonable enough. At $100 a barrel,** it becomes easier to see how **a 2 percent increase in fuel consumption is enough to make an economy collapse.** Fortunately, the reverse is also true. When our economies stop growing, less oil is needed. For example, after the big decline in 2008, global oil demand actually fell for the first time since 1983. That’s why the best cure for high [oil prices](http://topics.bloomberg.com/oil-prices/) is high oil prices. When prices rise to a level that causes an economic crash, lower prices inevitably follow. **Over the last four decades, each time oil prices have spiked, the global economy has entered a recession.** Consider the first oil shock, after the Yom Kippur War in 1973, when the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries’ Arab members turned off the taps on roughly 8 percent of the world’s oil supply by cutting shipments to the U.S. and other Israeli allies. Crude prices spiked, and by 1974, [real GDP](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/EHGDUSY:IND) in the U.S. had shrunk by 2.5 percent. The second OPEC oil shock happened during Iran’s revolution and the subsequent war with Iraq. Disruptions to Iranian production during the revolution sent crude prices higher, pushing the North American economy into a [recession](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/USRINDEX:IND) for the first half of 1980. A few months later, Iran’s war with Iraq shut off 6 percent of world oil production, sending North America into a double-dip recession that began in the spring of 1981. Kuwait Invasion When [Saddam Hussein](http://topics.bloomberg.com/saddam-hussein/) invaded [Kuwait](http://topics.bloomberg.com/kuwait/) a decade later, oil prices doubled to $40 a barrel, an unheard-of level at the time. The first [Gulf War](http://topics.bloomberg.com/gulf-war/) disrupted almost 10 percent of the world’s oil supply, sending major oil-consuming countries into a recession in the fall of 1990. Guess what oil prices were doing in 2008, when the world fell into the deepest recession since the 1930s? From trading around $30 a barrel in 2004, **oil prices marched steadily higher before hitting a peak of $147 a barrel in the summer of 2008. Unlike past oil price shocks, this time there wasn’t even a supply disruption to blame. The spigot was wide open. The problem was, we could no longer afford to buy what was flowing through it. There are many ways an oil shock can hurt an economy. When prices spike, most of us have little choice but to open our wallets. Paying more for oil means we have less cash to spend on food, shelter, furniture, clothes, travel and pretty much anything else. Expensive oil, coupled with the average American’s refusal to drive less, leaves a lot less money for the rest of the economy. Worse, when oil prices go up, so does inflation. And when inflation goes up, central banks respond by raising** [**interest rates**](http://topics.bloomberg.com/interest-rates/) **to keep prices in check.** From 2004 to 2006, U.S. energy inflation ran at 35 percent, according to the [Consumer Price Index](http://topics.bloomberg.com/consumer-price-index/). In turn, overall inflation, as measured by the CPI, accelerated from 1 percent to almost 6 percent. **What happened next was a fivefold bump in interest rates that devastated the massively leveraged U.S. housing market. High**er **rates popped the speculative housing bubble, which brought down the global economy. Unfortunately, this pattern of oil-driven inflation is with us again. And world** [**food prices**](http://www.bloomberg.com/quote/FAOFOODI:IND) **are being affected.** According to the food-[price index](http://topics.bloomberg.com/price-index/) tracked by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the cost of food rose almost 40 percent from 2009 to the beginning of 2012. And since 2002, the FAO’s food-price index, which measures a basket of five commodity groups (meat, dairy, cereals, oils and fats, and sugar), is up about 150 percent. Food Prices **A double whammy of rising oil and food prices means inflation will be here sooner than anyone would like to think. Rising inflation rates in China and India are a clear signal that those economies are growing at an unsustainable pace. China has made GDP growth of more than 8 percent a priority but needs to recalibrate its thinking to recognize the damping effects of high oil prices.** Growth might not stall entirely, but **clocking double-digit gains is no longer feasible, at least without triggering a calamitous increase in inflation**. If China and India, the new engines of global economic growth, are forced to adopt anti-inflationary monetary policies, the ripple effects for resource-based economies such as [Canada](http://topics.bloomberg.com/canada/), [Australia](http://topics.bloomberg.com/australia/) and [Brazil](http://topics.bloomberg.com/brazil/) will be felt in a hurry. **Triple-digit oil prices will end the lofty economic hopes of India and China**, which are looking to achieve the same sort of sustained growth that [North America](http://topics.bloomberg.com/north-america/) and Europe enjoyed in the postwar era. There is an unavoidable obstacle that puts such ambitions out of reach: Today’s oil isn’t flowing from the same places it did yesterday. More importantly, it’s not flowing at the same cost. **Conventional oil production, the easy-to-get-at stuff from the** [**Middle East**](http://topics.bloomberg.com/middle-east/) **or west Texas, hasn’t increased in more than five years. And that’s with record crude prices giving explorers all the incentive in the world to drill.** According to the [International Energy Agency](http://topics.bloomberg.com/international-energy-agency/), **conventional production has already peaked and is set to decline steadily over the next few decades.** That doesn’t mean there won’t be any more oil. New reserves are being found all the time in new places. What the decline in conventional production does mean, though, is that **future economic growth will be fueled by expensive oil from nonconventional sources such as the** [**tar sands**](http://topics.bloomberg.com/tar-sands/)**, offshore wells in the deep waters of the world’s oceans and even oil shales,** which come with environmental costs that range from carbon-dioxide emissions to potential groundwater contamination. **And even if new supplies are found, what matters to the economy is the cost of getting that supply flowing.** It’s not enough for the global [energy industry](http://topics.bloomberg.com/energy-industry/) simply to find new caches of oil; **the crude must be affordable.** Triple-digit prices make it profitable to tap ever-more-expensive sources of oil, but the prices needed to pull this crude out of the ground will throw our economies right back into a recession. **The energy industry’s task is not simply to find oil, but also to find stuff we can afford to burn. And that’s where the industry is failing. Each new barrel we pull out of the ground is costing us more than the last. The resources may be there for the taking, but our economies are already telling us we can’t afford the cost.**

**Sugar cane ethanol solves – extremely efficient**

**Newsweek, 7** (Newsweek, “Sugar Rush,” <http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2007/04/15/sugar-rush.html>, April 15, 2007)

He won't be the last. Thanks to global climate change, sugar now is in big demand. The drum-beat of alarm over global warming has set businesses clamoring for a piece of the sugar-cane action. There are plenty of other ways to make ethanol, of course, and scientists the world over are busy tinkering with everything from switchgrass to sweet potatoes. U.S. farmers make it from corn, but with the scarcity of arable land there's just so much they can plant without crowding out other premium crops, like soy beans. (Meantime, **the combination of limited land and surging demand have sent corn prices through the roof**). **So** far **nothing beats sugarcane**—which grows in the tropics—**for an abundant, cheap source of energy**. **Unlike beets or corn**, **which** are confined to temperate zones and **must be transformed into carbohydrates before they can be converted into sugar and finally alcohol, sugarcane is already halfway there**. That means the sugar barons like Ometto spend much less energy than the competition, not to mention money. The moral imperative of finding a substitute for fossil fuels has lent an air of respectability to new ventures to produce biofuels from sugar—a marked contrast to the sugar barons of old, known for their ruthless ways and their appetite for taxpayers' money. "The distillers who ten years ago were the bandits of agribusiness are becoming national and world heroes," Brazilian president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Lula declared recently. **"[E]thanol and biodiesel are more than an answer to our dangerous 'addiction' to fossil fuels. This is the beginning of a reassessment of the global strategy to protect our environment."**

**Economic collapse causes nuclear war**

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Two neatly opposed scenarios for the future of the world order illustrate the range of possibilities, albeit at the risk of oversimplification. The first scenario entails the premature crumbling of the post-Westphalian system. One or more of the acute tensions apparent today evolves into an open and traditional conflict between states, perhaps even involving the use of nuclear weapons. The crisis might be triggered by a collapse of the global economic and financial system, the vulnerability of which we have just experienced, and the prospect of a second Great Depression, with consequences for peace and democracy similar to those of the first. Whatever the trigger, the unlimited exercise of national sovereignty, exclusive self-interest and rejection of outside interference would likely be amplified, emptying, perhaps entirely, the half-full glass of multilateralism, including the UN and the European Union. Many of the more likely conflicts, such as between Israel and Iran or India and Pakistan, have potential religious dimensions. Short of war, tensions such as those related to immigration might become unbearable. Familiar issues of creed and identity could be exacerbated. One way or another, the secular rational approach would be sidestepped by a return to theocratic absolutes, competing or converging with secular absolutes such as unbridled nationalism. One symptom that makes such a scenario plausible has become visible. Many commentators have identified anger or anxiety as a common driver of the Tea Party movement in the United States and the rise of xenophobic parties in Europe, perhaps stemming from a self-perception of decline. Anger (directed towards the neo-colonialist or pro-Israeli West or – especially recently – domestic authoritarian regimes) has also been associated with grievances in the Middle East, following the failure of earlier reformist and secular movements. 10 Despite relative popular optimism, anger can also be detected in Asia, hand in hand with chauvinism and a sense of lack of appropriate recognition by others, stemming from a self-perception of rising influence and power.

**Their defense lacks causality and statistical backing**

**Royal 10** – Director of Cooperative Threat Reduction Policy, US-Department of Defense, policy advisor (Jedidiah, “Economics of War and Peace: Economic, Legal, and Political Perspectives”, pg. 212-214; Print.)//Beddow

The counterargument to contagion is the ‘risk-sharing’ argument. It suggests that while trade and financial linkages may spread a crisis, this creates a cushioning effect that, overall, minimizes the effects on any individual state. In other words, interdependence createsshock-absorbing linkages that soften a state’s vulnerability to dramatic economic downturns (see, e.g., Kelemli-Ozcan, Sorensen, & Yosha, 2003). Gallegati, Greenwald, Richiardi, and Stiglitz (2008) have made a convincing observation that would appear to clarify this debate. They have provided statistical modeling indicating that risk-sharing and contagion are in fact two sides of the same coin. When economic times are good, inter-linkages provide mechanisms for the diffusion of individual agents that face a liquidity crisis. A leader can request a creditor defer payment, whereas a creditor can then transfer this cost on to other agents. As such the system would absorb the crisis. When liquidity is relatively more scarce during down times, a sufficiently large negative shock will use those very sameinter-linkages to transmit that shock to other agents in the system. As a result, ‘risk sharing is beneficial only when the overall economic environment is favourable, while in harsh times it might be better to stay alone… [linkage during market downturns] becomes socially detrimental; not only is it that the expected number of defaults is higher when the economic agents are connected, but defaults become a systemic failure’ (Gallegati et al., 2008. Pp.5. 16). Kose, Prasad, and Terrones (2009) considered the same question and found only mild support for risk-sharing and only among developed, industrial economies. They found no evidence that developing, non-industrial countries are able to share risk. The authors break relatively new ground in suggesting why this is the case for non-industrial states: One possibility is that these countries rely more on less stable capital such as bank loans and other forms of debt that may not allow for efficient risk sharing. Indeed, we break up stocks of external assets and liabilities into different categories – FDI, portfolio equity, portfolio debt, etc. – we find that the underlying composition of capital flows influences the ability of developing countries to share risk. In particular, external debt appears to hinder the ability of emerging market economies to share their consumption risk. (Kose, Prasad, & Terrones, 2009. P. 259) One reason why interdependent states may not be well-suited to share risk is due to the fact that interdependence leads to economic specialization and reliance on external financing. Gande, John, and Senbet (2008) and Corsetii et al. (1999) provide conceptual and analytical links between specialization, moral hazard, and contagion. Thus, the answer to the first question set out at the beginning of this section, whether economic integration and economic crises are linked, seems reasonably well-established. Substantial recent scholarship indicates a positive association between economic interdependence and economic crises. What then about the second question? Is there a positive correlation between economic crises and armed conflict? The impacts at an individual level and on a state level are intuitive and well-documented (See, e.g., Richards & Gelleny, 2006). Rodrik (1997a, 197b), among others, argues that the instability in the global economic system contributes to social disintegration and political conflict.’ Social unrest, regime changes, and even civil war have directly resultedfrom the vagaries of economic integration. Less intuitive is how periods of economic decline may increase the likelihood of external conflict. Political science literature has contributed a moderate degree of attention to the impact of economic decline and the security and defence behavior of interdependent states. Research in this vein has been considered at systemic, dyadic and national levels. Several notable contributions follow. First, on the systemic level, Pollins (2008) advances Modelski and Thompson’s (1996) work on leadership cycle theory, finding thatrhythms in the global economy are associated with the rise and fall of a pre-eminent power and the **often**bloody transition**from one pre-eminent leader to the next**. As such, exogenous shocks such as economic crises could user in a redistribution of relative power (see also Gilpin, 1981) that leads to uncertainty about power balances, increasing the risk of miscalculation (Fearon, 1995). Alternatively, even a relatively certain redistribution of power could lead to a permissive environment for conflict as a rising power may seek to challenge a declining power (Werner, 1999). Separately, Pollins (1996) shows **that global economic cycles combined with parallel leadership cycles impact the likelihood of conflict among major, medium, and small powers,**although he suggests that the causes and connections between global economic conditions and security conditions remain unknown. Second, on a dyadic level. Copeland's (1996. 2000) theory of trade expectations suggests that 'future expectation of trade' is a significant variable in understanding economic conditions and security behaviour of states. He argues that interdependent states are likely to gain pacific benefits from trade so long as they have an optimistic view of future trade relations. However, if the expectations of future trade decline, particularly for difficult to replace items such as energy resources, the likelihood for conflict increases, as states will be inclined to use force to gain access to those resources. Crises could potentially be the trigger for decreased trade expectations either on its own or because it triggers protectionist moves by interdependent states.4 Third, others have considered the link between economic decline and external armed conflict at a national level. Blomberg and Hess (2002) find a strong correlation between internal conflict and external conflict, particularly during periods of economic downturn. They write, The linkages between internal and external conflict and prosperity are strong and mutually reinforcing. Economic conflict tends to spawn internal conflict, which in turn returns the favour. Moreover, the presence of a recession lends to amplify the extent to which international and external conflicts self-rein force each other. (Blombcrj! & Hess. 2002. p. 89) Economic decline has also been linked with an increase in the likelihood of terrorism (Blomberg. Hess. & Weerapana, 2004). which has the capacity to spill across borders and lead to external tensions. Furthermore, crises generally reduce the popularity of a sitting government. "Diversionary theory" suggests that, when facing unpopularity arising from economic decline, sitting governments have increased incentives to fabricate external military conflicts to create a 'rally around the flag' effect. Wang (1996), DeRouen (1995), and Blombcrg. Mess, and Thacker (2006) find supporting evidence showing that economic decline and use of force are at least indirectly correlated. Gelpi (1997), Miller (1999). and Kisangani and Pickering (2009) suggest that the tendency towards diversionary tactics arr greater for democratic states than autocratic states, due to the fact that democratic leaders are generally more susceptible to being removed from office due to lack of domestic support. DeRouen (2000) has provided evidence showing that periods of weak economic performance in the United States, and thus weak Presidential popularity, are statistically linked to an increase in the use of force.

**Second, boosting economic competitiveness bolsters hegemony and solves war**

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Today, economic and fiscal trends pose the most severe long-term threat to the United States’ position as global leader. While the United States suffers from fiscal imbalances and low economic growth, the economies of rival powers are developing rapidly. The continuation of these two trends could lead to a shift from American primacy toward a multi-polar global system, leading in turn to increased geopolitical rivalry and even war among the great powers. The current recession is the result of a deep [financial crisis](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad), not a mere fluctuation in the business cycle. Recovery is likely to be protracted. The crisis was preceded by the buildup over two decades of enormous amounts of debt throughout the U.S. economy — ultimately totaling almost 350 percent of GDP — and the development of credit-fueled asset bubbles, particularly in the housing sector. When the bubbles burst, huge amounts of wealth were destroyed, and unemployment rose to over 10 percent. The decline of tax revenues and massive countercyclical spending put the U.S. government on an unsustainable fiscal path. Publicly held national debt rose from 38 to over 60 percent of GDP in three years. Without faster economic growth and actions to reduce deficits, publicly held national debt is projected to reach dangerous proportions. If interest rates were to rise significantly, annual interest payments — which already are larger than the defense budget — would crowd out other spending or require substantial [tax increases](http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/259024/economy-and-national-security-zalmay-khalilzad) that would undercut economic growth. Even worse, if unanticipated events trigger what economists call a “sudden stop” in credit markets for U.S. debt, the United States would be unable to roll over its outstanding obligations, precipitating a sovereign-debt crisis that would almost certainly compel a radical retrenchment of the United States internationally. Such scenarios would reshape the international order. It was the economic devastation of Britain and France during World War II, as well as the rise of other powers, that led both countries to relinquish their empires. In the late 1960s, British leaders concluded that they lacked the economic capacity to maintain a presence “east of Suez.” Soviet economic weakness, which crystallized under Gorbachev, contributed to their decisions to withdraw from Afghanistan, abandon Communist regimes in Eastern Europe, and allow the Soviet Union to fragment. If the U.S. debt problem goes critical, the United States would be compelled to retrench, reducing its military spending and shedding international commitments. We face this domestic challenge while other major powers are experiencing rapid economic growth. Even though countries such as China, India, and Brazil have profound political, social, demographic, and economic problems, their economies are growing faster than ours, and this could alter the global distribution of power. These trends could in the long term produce a multi-polar world. If U.S. policymakers fail to act and other powers continue to grow, it is not a question of whether but when a new international order will emerge. The closing of the gap between the United States and its rivals could intensify geopolitical competition among major powers, increase incentives for local powers to play major powers against one another, and undercut our will to preclude or respond to international crises because of the higher risk of escalation. The stakes are high. In modern history, the longest period of peace among the great powers has been the era of U.S. leadership. By contrast, multi-polar systems have been unstable, with their competitive dynamics resulting in frequent crises and major wars among the great powers. Failures of multi-polar international systems produced both world wars. American retrenchment could have devastating consequences. Without an American security blanket, regional powers could rearm in an attempt to balance against emerging threats. Under this scenario, there would be a heightened possibility of arms races, miscalculation, or other crises spiraling into all-out conflict. Alternatively, in seeking to accommodate the stronger powers, weaker powers may shift their geopolitical posture away from the United States. Either way, hostile states would be emboldened to make aggressive moves in their regions. As rival powers rise, Asia in particular is likely to emerge as a zone of great-power competition. Beijing’s economic rise has enabled a dramatic military buildup focused on acquisitions of naval, cruise, and ballistic missiles, long-range stealth aircraft, and anti-satellite capabilities. China’s strategic modernization is aimed, ultimately, at denying the United States access to the seas around China. Even as cooperative economic ties in the region have grown, China’s expansive territorial claims — and provocative statements and actions following crises in Korea and incidents at sea — have roiled its relations with South Korea, Japan, India, and Southeast Asian states. Still, the United States is the most significant barrier facing Chinese hegemony and aggression. Given the risks, the United States must focus on restoring its economic and fiscal condition while checking and managing the rise of potential adversarial regional powers such as China. While we face significant challenges, the U.S. economy still accounts for over 20 percent of the world’s GDP. American institutions — particularly those providing enforceable rule of law — set it apart from all the rising powers. Social cohesion underwrites political stability. U.S. demographic trends are healthier than those of any other developed country. A culture of innovation, excellent institutions of higher education, and a vital sector of small and medium-sized enterprises propel the U.S. economy in ways difficult to quantify. Historically, Americans have responded pragmatically, and sometimes through trial and error, to work our way through the kind of crisis that we face today. The policy question is how to enhance economic growth and employment while cutting discretionary spending in the near term and curbing the growth of entitlement spending in the out years. Republican members of Congress have outlined a plan. Several think tanks and commissions, including President Obama’s debt commission, have done so as well. Some consensus exists on measures to pare back the recent increases in domestic spending, restrain future growth in defense spending, and reform the tax code (by reducing tax expenditures while lowering individual and corporate rates). These are promising options. The key remaining question is whether the president and leaders of both parties on Capitol Hill have the will to act and the skill to fashion bipartisan solutions. Whether we take the needed actions is a choice, however difficult it might be. It is clearly within our capacity to put our economy on a better trajectory. In garnering political support for cutbacks, the president and members of Congress should point not only to the domestic consequences of inaction — but also to the geopolitical implications. As the United States gets its economic and fiscal house in order, it should take steps to prevent a flare-up in Asia. The United States can do so by signaling that its domestic challenges will not impede its intentions to check Chinese expansionism. This can be done in cost-efficient ways. While China’s economic rise enables its military modernization and international assertiveness, it also frightens rival powers. The Obama administration has wisely moved to strengthen relations with allies and potential partners in the region but more can be done. Some Chinese policies encourage other parties to join with the United States, and the U.S. should not let these opportunities pass. China’s military assertiveness should enable security cooperation with countries on China’s periphery — particularly Japan, India, and Vietnam — in ways that complicate Beijing’s strategic calculus. China’s mercantilist policies and currency manipulation — which harm developing states both in East Asia and elsewhere — should be used to fashion a coalition in favor of a more balanced trade system. Since Beijing’s over-the-top reaction to the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize to a Chinese democracy activist alienated European leaders, highlighting human-rights questions would not only draw supporters from nearby countries but also embolden reformers within China. Since the end of the Cold War, a stable economic and financial condition at home has enabled America to have an expansive role in the world. Today we can no longer take this for granted. Unless we get our economic house in order, there is a risk that domestic stagnation in combination with the rise of rival powers will undermine our ability to deal with growing international problems. Regional hegemons in Asia could seize the moment, leading the world toward a new, dangerous era of multi-polarity.

**Primacy is the mega-impact**

**Brooks, Ikenberry and Wohlforth ‘13**

Stephen Brooks, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry, Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University and Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul, John Wohlforth, Daniel Webster Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, Jan/Feb 2013, Foreign Affairs, Lean Forward, EBSCO

Of course, even if it is true that the costs of deep engagement fall far below what advocates of retrenchment claim, they would not be worth bearing unless they yielded greater benefits. In fact, they do. **The** most **obvious benefit of the current strategy is that it reduces the risk of a dangerous conflict**. The **U**nited **S**tates' **security commitments deter states with aspirations to regional hegemony from contemplating expansion and dissuade U.S. partners from trying to solve security problems on their own in ways that would end up threatening other states.** **Skeptics discount this benefit by arguing** that U.S. security guarantees aren't necessary to prevent dangerous rivalries from erupting. They maintain that the high costs of territorial conquest and the many tools countries can use to signal their benign intentions are enough to prevent conflict. In other words, **major powers could peacefully manage regional multipolarity without the American pacifier**. But **that outlook is too sanguine**. **If Washington got out of East Asia, Japan and South Korea would likely expand their military capabilities and go nuclear, which could provoke a destabilizing reaction from China.** It's worth noting that **during the Cold War, both South Korea and Taiwan tried to obtain nuclear weapons; the only thing that stopped them was the U**nited **S**tates, which used its security commitments to restrain their nuclear temptations. Similarly, **were the U**nited **S**tates **to leave the Middle East, the countries currently backed by Washington**--**notably, Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia**--**might act in ways that would intensify the region's security dilemmas**. **There would** even **be reason to worry about Europe.** Although it's hard to imagine the return of great-power military competition in a post-American Europe, it's not difficult to foresee governments there refusing to pay the budgetary costs of higher military outlays and the political costs of increasing EU defense cooperation. **The result might be a continent incapable of securing itself from threats on its periphery, unable to join foreign interventions** on which U.S. leaders might want European help, **and vulnerable to the influence of outside rising powers**. **Given how easily a U.S. withdrawal from key regions could lead to dangerous competition**, **advocates of retrenchment** tend to put forth another **argument**: that such **rivalries wouldn't actually hurt the U**nited **S**tates. To be sure, few doubt that the United States could survive the return of conflict among powers in Asia or the Middle East--but at what cost? **Were states in one or both of these regions to start competing against one another, they would likely boost their military budgets, arm client states, and** perhaps even **start regional proxy wars, all of which should concern the U**nited **S**tates, in part because its lead in military capabilities would narrow. **Greater regional insecurity could** also **produce cascades of nuclear proliferation** as powers such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan built nuclear forces of their own. Those **countries' regional competitors might then also seek nuclear arsenals**. Although nuclear deterrence can promote stability between two states with the kinds of nuclear forces that the Soviet Union and the United States possessed, things get shakier when there are multiple nuclear rivals with less robust arsenals. **As the number of nuclear powers increases, the probability of illicit transfers, irrational decisions, accidents, and unforeseen crises goes up.** The case for abandoning the United States' global role misses the underlying security logic of the current approach. **By reassuring allies and actively managing regional relations, Washington dampens competition in the world s key areas**, thereby **preventing the emergence of a hothouse in which countries would grow new military capabilities**. **For proof that this strategy is working, one need look no further than the defense budgets of the current great powers**: on average, since 1991 they have kept their military expenditures as A percentage of GDP to historic lows, and they have not attempted to match the United States' top-end military capabilities. Moreover, all of the world's most modern militaries are U.S. allies, and the United States' military lead over its potential rivals .is by many measures growing. On top of all this, **the current grand strategy acts as a hedge against the emergence regional hegemons**. Some **supporters of retrenchment argue** that **the U.S.** military **should keep its forces over the horizon and pass the buck to local powers** to do the dangerous work of counterbalancing rising regional powers. **Washington**, they contend, **should deploy forces abroad only when a truly credible contender for regional hegemony arises**, as in the cases of Germany and Japan during World War II and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Yet the**re is already a potential contender for regional hegemony--China--and to balance it, the U**nited **S**tates **will need to maintain its key alliances in Asia and the military capacity to intervene there**. **The implication is that the U**nited **S**tates **should get out of Afghanistan and Iraq, reduce its military presence in Europe, and pivot to Asia. Yet that is exactly what the Obama administration is doing**. MILITARY DOMINANCE, ECONOMIC PREEMINENCE **Preoccupied with security issues, critics** of the current grand strategy **miss one of its most important benefits: sustaining an open global economy** and a favorable place for the United States within it. To be sure, the sheer size of its output would guarantee the United States a major role in the global economy whatever grand strategy it adopted. Yet **the country's military dominance undergirds its economic leadership**. In addition to **protecting the world economy from instability, its military commitments and naval superiority help secure the sea-lanes and other shipping corridors that allow trade to flow freely and cheaply**. **Were the U**nited **S**tates **to pull back from the world, the task of securing the global commons would get much harder**. **Washington would have less leverage with which it could convince countries to cooperate on economic matters and less access to the military bases throughout the world needed to keep the seas open.** A global role also lets the United States structure the world economy in ways that serve its particular economic interests. During the Cold War, Washington used its overseas security commitments to get allies to embrace the economic policies it preferred--convincing West Germany in the 1960s, for example, to take costly steps to support the U.S. dollar as a reserve currency. U.S. defense agreements work the same way today. For example, when negotiating the 2011 free-trade agreement with South Korea, U.S. officials took advantage of Seoul's desire to use the agreement as a means of tightening its security relations with Washington. As one diplomat explained to us privately, "We asked for changes in labor and environment clauses, in auto clauses, and the Koreans took it all." Why? Because they feared a failed agreement would be "a setback to the political and security relationship." More broadly, **the U**nited **S**tates **wields its security leverage to shape the overall structure of the global economy.** Much of what the United States wants from the economic order is more of the same: for instance, it likes the current structure of the World Trade Organization and the International Monetary Fund and prefers that free trade continue. Washington wins when U.S. allies favor this status quo, and one reason they are inclined to support the existing system is because they value their military alliances. Japan, to name one example, has shown interest in the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Obama administration's most important free-trade initiative in the region, less because its economic interests compel it to do so than because Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda believes that his support will strengthen Japan's security ties with the United States. **The U**nited **S**tates' **geopolitical dominance** also **helps keep the U.S. dollar in place as the world's reserve currency, which confers enormous benefits on the country**, such as a greater ability to borrow money. This is perhaps clearest with Europe: the EU'S dependence on the United States for its security precludes the EU from having the kind of political leverage to support the euro that the United States has with the dollar. As with other aspects of the global economy, the United States does not provide its leadership for free: **it extracts disproportionate gains. Shirking that responsibility would place those benefits at risk.** CREATING COOPERATION **What goes for the global economy goes for other forms of international cooperation**. Here, too, American leadership benefits many countries but disproportionately helps the United States. **In order to counter transnational threats, such as terrorism, piracy, organized crime, climate change, and pandemics, states have to work together and take collective action**. But **cooperation does not come about effortlessly**, especially when national interests diverge. **The U**nited **S**tates' **military efforts to promote stability and its broader leadership make it easier for Washington to launch joint initiatives and shape them in ways that reflect U.S. interests**. After all, **cooperation is hard to come by in regions where chaos reigns, and it flourishes where leaders can anticipate lasting stability**. U.S. **alliances** are about security first, but they also **provide the political framework and channels of communication for cooperation on nonmilitary issue**s. NATO, for example, has spawned new institutions, such as the Atlantic Council, a think tank, that make it easier for Americans and Europeans to talk to one another and do business. Likewise, consultations with allies in East Asia spill over into other policy issues; for example, when American diplomats travel to Seoul to manage the military alliance, they also end up discussing the Trans-Pacific Partnership. **Thanks to conduits such as this, the U**nited **S**tates **can use bargaining chips in one issue area to make progress in others. The benefits of these communication channels are especially pronounced when it comes to fighting the kinds of threats that require new forms of cooperation, such as terrorism and pandemics**. With its alliance system in place, **the U**nited **S**tates **is in a stronger position than it would otherwise be to advance cooperation and share burdens**. For example, the intelligence-sharing network within NATO, which was originally designed to gather information on the Soviet Union, has been adapted to deal with terrorism. Similarly, after a tsunami in the Indian Ocean devastated surrounding countries in 2004, Washington had a much easier time orchestrating a fast humanitarian response with Australia, India, and Japan, since their militaries were already comfortable working with one another. The operation did wonders for the United States' image in the region. The United States' global role also has the more direct effect of facilitating the bargains among governments that get cooperation going in the first place. As the scholar Joseph Nye has written, "The American military role in deterring threats to allies, or of assuring access to a crucial resource such as oil in the Persian Gulf, means that the provision of protective force can be used in bargaining situations. **Sometimes the linkage may be direct; more often it is a factor not mentioned openly but present in the back of statesmen's minds."** THE DEVIL WE KNOW Should America come home? For many prominent scholars of international relations, the answer is yes--a view that seems even wiser in the wake of the disaster in Iraq and the Great Recession. Yet **their arguments simply don't hold up. There is little evidence that the U**nited **S**tates **would save** much **money** switching to a smaller global posture. **Nor is the current strategy self-defeating: it has not provoked** the formation of **counterbalancing coalitions or caused the country to spend itself into economic decline**. **Nor will it condemn the U**nited **S**tates **to foolhardy wars in the future**. **What the strategy does do is help prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world's most important regions, keep the global economy humming, and make international cooperation easier. Charting a different course would threaten all these** benefits. This is not to say that the United States' current foreign policy can't be adapted to new circumstances and challenges. Washington does not need to retain every commitment at all costs, and there is nothing wrong with rejiggering its strategy in response to new opportunities or setbacks. That is what the Nixon administration did by winding down the Vietnam War and increasing the United States' reliance on regional partners to contain Soviet power, and it is what the Obama administration has been doing after the Iraq war by pivoting to Asia. These episodes of rebalancing belie the argument that a powerful and internationally engaged America cannot tailor its policies to a changing world. **A grand strategy of actively managing global security and promoting the liberal economic order has served the United States exceptionally well** for the past six decades, and **there is no reason to give it up now. The country's globe-spanning posture is the devil we know, and a world with a disengaged America is the devil we don't know**. **Were American leaders to choose retrenchment, they would in essence be running a massive experiment to test how the world would work without an engaged and liberal leading power. The results could** well **be disastrous**.

**U.S. pursuit of heg is locked-in**

Zach **Dorfman 12**, assistant editor of Ethics and International Affairs, the journal of the Carnegie Council, and co-editor of the Montreal Review, “What We Talk About When We Talk About Isolationism”, May 18, <http://dissentmagazine.org/online.php?id=605>

The rise of China notwithstanding, the United States remains the world’s sole superpower. Its military (and, to a considerable extent, political) hegemony extends not just over North America or even the Western hemisphere, but also Europe, large swaths of Asia, and Africa. Its interests are global; nothing is outside its potential sphere of influence. There are an estimated 660 to 900 American military bases in roughly forty countries worldwide, although figures on the matter are notoriously difficult to ascertain, largely because of subterfuge on the part of the military. According to official data there are active-duty U.S. military personnel in 148 countries, or over 75 percent of the world’s states. The United States checks Russian power in Europe and Chinese power in South Korea and Japan and Iranian power in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Turkey. In order to maintain a frigid peace between Israel and Egypt, the American government hands the former $2.7 billion in military aid every year, and the latter $1.3 billion. It also gives Pakistan more than $400 million dollars in military aid annually (not including counterinsurgency operations, which would drive the total far higher), Jordan roughly $200 million, and Colombia over $55 million. U.S. long-term military commitments are also manifold. It is one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council, the only institution legally permitted to sanction the use of force to combat “threats to international peace and security.” In 1949 the United States helped found NATO, the first peacetime military alliance extending beyond North and South America in U.S. history, which now has twenty-eight member states. The United States also has a trilateral defense treaty with Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral mutual defense treaties with Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, and South Korea. It is this sort of reach that led Madeleine Albright to call the United States the sole “indispensible power” on the world stage. The idea that global military dominance and political hegemony is in the U.S. national interest—and the world’s interest—is generally taken for granted domestically. Opposition to it is limited to the libertarian Right and anti-imperialist Left, both groups on the margins of mainstream political discourse. Today, American supremacy is assumed rather than argued for: in an age of tremendous political division, it is a bipartisan first principle of foreign policy, a presupposition. In this area at least, one wishes for a little less agreement. In Promise and Peril: America at the Dawn of a Global Age, Christopher McKnight Nichols provides an erudite account of a period before such a consensus existed, when ideas about America’s role on the world stage were fundamentally contested. As this year’s presidential election approaches, each side will portray the difference between the candidates’ positions on foreign policy as immense. Revisiting Promise and Peril shows us just how narrow the American worldview has become, and how our public discourse has become narrower still. Nichols focuses on the years between 1890 and 1940, during America’s initial ascent as a global power. He gives special attention to the formative debates surrounding the Spanish-American War, U.S. entry into the First World War, and potential U.S. membership in the League of Nations—debates that were constitutive of larger battles over the nature of American society and its fragile political institutions and freedoms. During this period, foreign and domestic policy were often linked as part of a cohesive political vision for the country. Nichols illustrates this through intellectual profiles of some of the period’s most influential figures, including senators Henry Cabot Lodge and William Borah, socialist leader Eugene Debs, philosopher and psychologist William James, journalist Randolph Bourne, and the peace activist Emily Balch. Each of them interpreted isolationism and internationalism in distinct ways, sometimes deploying the concepts more for rhetorical purposes than as cornerstones of a particular worldview. Today, isolationism is often portrayed as intellectually bankrupt, a redoubt for idealists, nationalists, xenophobes, and fools. Yet the term now used as a political epithet has deep roots in American political culture. Isolationist principles can be traced back to George Washington’s farewell address, during which he urged his countrymen to steer clear of “foreign entanglements” while actively seeking nonbinding commercial ties. (Whether economic commitments do in fact entail political commitments is another matter.) Thomas Jefferson echoed this sentiment when he urged for “commerce with all nations, [and] alliance with none.” Even the Monroe Doctrine, in which the United States declared itself the regional hegemon and demanded noninterference from European states in the Western hemisphere, was often viewed as a means of isolating the United States from Europe and its messy alliance system. In Nichols’s telling, however, modern isolationism was born from the debates surrounding the Spanish-American War and the U.S. annexation of the Philippines. Here isolationism began to take on a much more explicitly anti-imperialist bent. Progressive isolationists such as William James found U.S. policy in the Philippines—which it had “liberated” from Spanish rule just to fight a bloody counterinsurgency against Philippine nationalists—anathema to American democratic traditions and ideas about national self-determination. As Promise and Peril shows, however, “cosmopolitan isolationists” like James never called for “cultural, economic, or complete political separation from the rest of the world.” Rather, they wanted the United States to engage with other nations peacefully and without pretensions of domination. They saw the United States as a potential force for good in the world, but they also placed great value on neutrality and non-entanglement, and wanted America to focus on creating a more just domestic order. James’s anti-imperialism was directly related to his fear of the effects of “bigness.” He argued forcefully against all concentrations of power, especially those between business, political, and military interests. He knew that such vested interests would grow larger and more difficult to control if America became an overseas empire. Others, such as “isolationist imperialist” Henry Cabot Lodge, the powerful senator from Massachusetts, argued that fighting the Spanish-American War and annexing the Philippines were isolationist actions to their core. First, banishing the Spanish from the Caribbean comported with the Monroe Doctrine; second, adding colonies such as the Philippines would lead to greater economic growth without exposing the United States to the vicissitudes of outside trade. Prior to the Spanish-American War, many feared that the American economy’s rapid growth would lead to a surplus of domestic goods and cause an economic disaster. New markets needed to be opened, and the best way to do so was to dominate a given market—that is, a country—politically. Lodge’s defense of this “large policy” was public and, by today’s standards, quite bald. Other proponents of this policy included Teddy Roosevelt (who also believed that war was good for the national character) and a significant portion of the business class. For Lodge and Roosevelt, “isolationism” meant what is commonly referred to today as “unilateralism”: the ability for the United States to do what it wants, when it wants. Other “isolationists” espoused principles that we would today call internationalist. Randolph Bourne, a precocious journalist working for the New Republic, passionately opposed American entry into the First World War, much to the detriment of his writing career. He argued that hypernationalism would cause lasting damage to the American social fabric. He was especially repulsed by wartime campaigns to Americanize immigrants. Bourne instead envisioned a “transnational America”: a place that, because of its distinct cultural and political traditions and ethnic diversity, could become an example to the rest of the world. Its respect for plurality at home could influence other countries by example, but also by allowing it to mediate international disputes without becoming a party to them. Bourne wanted an America fully engaged with the world, but not embroiled in military conflicts or alliances. This was also the case for William Borah, the progressive Republican senator from Idaho. Borah was an agrarian populist and something of a Jeffersonian: he believed axiomatically in local democracy and rejected many forms of federal encroachment. He was opposed to extensive immigration, but not “anti-immigrant.” Borah thought that America was strengthened by its complex ethnic makeup and that an imbalance tilted toward one group or another would have deleterious effects. But it is his famously isolationist foreign policy views for which Borah is best known. As Nichols writes: He was consistent in an anti-imperialist stance against U.S. domination abroad; yet he was ambivalent in cases involving what he saw as involving obvious national interest….He also without fail argued that any open-ended military alliances were to be avoided at all costs, while arguing that to minimize war abroad as well as conflict at home should always be a top priority for American politicians. Borah thus cautiously supported entry into the First World War on national interest grounds, but also led a group of senators known as “the irreconcilables” in their successful effort to prevent U.S. entry into the League of Nations. His paramount concern was the collective security agreement in the organization’s charter: he would not assent to a treaty that stipulated that the United States would be obligated to intervene in wars between distant powers where the country had no serious interest at stake. Borah possessed an alternative vision for a more just and pacific international order. Less than a decade after he helped scuttle American accession to the League, he helped pass the Kellogg-Briand Pact (1928) in a nearly unanimous Senate vote. More than sixty states eventually became party to the pact, which outlawed war between its signatories and required them to settle their disputes through peaceful means. Today, realists sneer at the idealism of Kellogg-Briand, but the Senate was aware of the pact’s limitations and carved out clear exceptions for cases of national defense. Some supporters believed that, if nothing else, the law would help strengthen an emerging international norm against war. (Given what followed, this seems like a sad exercise in wish-fulfillment.) Unlike the League of Nations charter, the treaty faced almost no opposition from the isolationist bloc in the Senate, since it did not require the United States to enter into a collective security agreement or abrogate its sovereignty. This was a kind of internationalism Borah and his irreconcilables could proudly support. The United States today looks very different from the country in which Borah, let alone William James, lived, both domestically (where political and civil freedoms have been extended to women, African Americans, and gays and lesbians) and internationally (with its leading role in many global institutions). But different strains of isolationism persist. Newt Gingrich has argued for a policy of total “energy independence” (in other words, domestic drilling) while fulminating against President Obama for “bowing” to the Saudi king. While recently driving through an agricultural region of rural Colorado, I saw a giant roadside billboard calling for American withdrawal from the UN. Yet in the last decade, the Republican Party, with the partial exception of its Ron Paul/libertarian faction, has veered into such a belligerent unilateralism that its graybeards—one of whom, Senator Richard Lugar of Indiana, just lost a primary to a far-right challenger partly because of his reasonableness on foreign affairs—were barely able to ensure Senate ratification of a key nuclear arms reduction treaty with Russia. Many of these same people desire a unilateral war with Iran. And it isn’t just Republicans. Drone attacks have intensified in Yemen, Pakistan, and elsewhere under the Obama administration. Massive troop deployments continue unabated. We spend over $600 billion dollars a year on our military budget; the next largest is China’s, at “only” around $100 billion. Administrations come and go, but the national security state appears here to stay.

**Contention Two – Brazilian Ecosystems**

**Cuban ethanol solves Cerrado Destruction – displaces expansion into Brazilian ecosystems and avoids land conversion concerns**

**Specht ‘12**

(Jonathan – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc. B.A., Louisiana State University, 2009; J.D.,¶ Washington University in St. Louis 2012. “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States” – ExpressO – http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)

B. Environmental Effects of Sugarcane-Based Ethanol **If** future legislation does not revive the United States ethanol tariff that expired at the end of 2011 and **the trade embargo against Cuba is kept in place, Brazil will likely be the primary beneficiary.**109 The argument can be made that Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol is a more environmentally beneficial fuel source than domestic-corn based ethanol, because of the nature of sugarcanebased ethanol (discussed below).110 **Brazilian sugarcane**-based **ethanol comes, however, with** its own set of **environmental consequences.** The full debate over the environmental consequences of the Brazilian biofuel¶ production¶ 111¶ is largely beyond the scope of this Article. Still, the primary issue¶ in this dispute is worth noting, because it accentuates one of the most significant¶ differences between the U.S. corn-based ethanol industry and the potential¶ Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry. In Brazil, the expansion of sugarcane¶ production to meet demand for ethanol production has led to land use changes that parallel the expansion of corn production for ethanol in the United States.¶ Clearing portions of the Amazon rainforest¶ —¶ one of the most significant¶ repositories of carbon on Earth¶ 112¶ —¶ would represent an environmental cost of¶ ethanol production that outweighs its benefits. The Amazon region, however, is¶ largely unsuitable for sugarcane production.¶ 113¶ But, **sugarcane production is**¶ **contributing to destruction of a**nother **sensitive habitat, the bio-diverse Cerrado**¶ savannah **region of Brazil**.¶ 114¶ **Cuban sugar**cane-based **ethanol would have the environmental benefits of**¶ **Brazilian sugarcane-based ethanol without its most obvious negative factor,**¶ **damaging habitat in the Cerrado**¶ .¶ The environmental effects of biofuels depend¶ on a number of factors. Whether or not a given type of biofuel is¶ environmentally beneficial “depends on what the fuel is, how and where the¶ biomass was produced, what else the land could have been used for, how the¶ fuel was processed and how it is used.”¶ 115¶ Taken together, these **factors point to**¶ **sugar**cane-based **ethanol grown in Cuba as one of the most environmentally friendly biofuel**s possible. ¶ The environmental benefits of using sugarcane to produce ethanol are¶ numerous. First, it is much more energy efficient to derive ethanol from¶ sugarcane than corn. Making ethanol from corn only creates approximately 1.3¶ times the amount of energy used to produce it, but **making ethanol from¶ sugarcane creates approximately eight times the amount of energy used to produce it.**¶ 116¶ Second, **unlike** much of the **corn** **presently grown in Great Plains¶ states, sugarcane grown in Latin America does not need to be irrigated.¶ 117¶ Third,¶ sugarcane requires relatively small amounts of** chemical fertilizers, herbicides,¶ and **pesticide**s.¶ 118¶ Fourth, **whereas most U.S. ethanol refineries are powered by**¶ **coal or natural gas**,¶ 119¶ **sugar**cane **ethanol refineries can be powered by**¶ **bagasse**¶ , a¶ natural product left over from the sugar refining process.¶ 120¶ In fact, refineries¶ powered with¶ bagasse¶ can even produce more electricity than they need and sell power back to the electric grid.¶ 121¶ Fifth, although corn can only be planted and¶ harvested once a year, in tropical climates sugarcane can be cut from the same¶ stalks multiple times per year.¶ 122¶ Each of these factors in favor of sugarcane ethanol is true of ethanol from¶ Brazil as well as of any potential ethanol from Cuba. However, there are¶ additional environmental factors that clinch Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol as¶ one of the most environmentally friendly fuel sources available to the United¶ States under current technology.¶ 123¶ First, **because Cuba is closer to the United**¶ **States, transporting ethanol from Cuba to the United States would require less**¶ **energy than transporting ethanol from Brazil** to the United States (especially if it¶ is used in Florida, an option further explored in the section on economic¶ effects).¶ 124¶ Another reason Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol could be one of the most¶ environmentally friendly fuels possible is that **Cuba could produce a significant**¶ **amount of ethanol without any negative impacts on native habitat**. A striking¶ amount of **Cuban ag**ricultural **land** — fifty five percent as of 2007 — **is simply¶ lying fallow and is not cultivated** with anything.¶ 125¶ Although its character may¶ have changed due to years of neglect, **this land is not virgin native habitat like**¶ **the** grasslands of North Dakota or the **Cerrado of Brazil**. Cuba therefore could¶ greatly increase its production of sugarcane, and thus its production of¶ sugarcane-based ethanol, without negative impacts on wildlife habitat. While it¶ is not environmentally perfect — no form of energy is — **Cuban sugar**cane-¶ based **ethanol would raise fewer environmental concerns than the fuel sources it**¶ **would displace**: petroleum, domestic **corn-based ethanol, and Brazilian**¶ **sugar**cane based **ethanol.** **Therefore,** from a purely environmental perspective,¶ **changing U.S**. law and **policy** in order **to promote the importation of Cuban**¶ sugarcane-based **ethanol should be encouraged.**

**Cerrado’s key to global biod and a *strong carbon sink* – dense vegetation and underground biomass**

**Vitali ‘11**

(Isabella Vitali – Senior Policy Officer, WWF-UK.“Soya and the Cerrado: Brazil’s forgotten jewel – http://assets.wwf.org.uk/downloads/soya\_and\_the\_cerrado.pdf)

**Loss of the Cerrado is of global concern** **not only because**¶ **of its significant contribution to the world’s biodiversity,**¶ **but also because of its importance in terms of climate**¶ **change**. **CO2 emissions associated with the conversion**¶ **of the Cerrado are more than half** the total **emissions of the UK** and probably **already exceed those from Amazon**¶ **deforestation**. **Much less well known than its giant neighbour, the Amazon, the** Brazilian **Cerrado** or¶ woodland-savannah **is an extraordinary ecosystem worthy of global attention,**¶ especially in view of the intense pressure it has suffered and continues to suffer.¶ **Originally covering an area larger than Mexico**, more than 2m sq km, **the Cerrado is**¶ **an extremely diverse landscape occupying the entire central part of Brazil,** thought to¶ be a remnant of the ancient continent that existed at the time of the dinosaurs, before¶ the separation of South America and Africa.25¶ Most of the Cerrado is located on the high plateau of the continent. The ecosystem is¶ characterised by a pronounced dry period, between May and September. This leads¶ to fire-prone conditions in the drought season to which vegetation has adapted over¶ millions of years.26¶ Under the umbrella term Cerrado, **the region** actually **consists of a rich mosaic** of¶ contrasting landscapes **that makes this the most biodiverse** savannah **region on the**¶ **planet**. **No fewer than 11 different categories of landscape have been defined**,¶ including three types of forest; four varieties of ‘true’ savannah with shrubs and¶ sparse, twisted trees; and three separate kinds of grassland.27¶ **The diversity** of landscapes leads to a diversity of plantlife that **qualifies the Cerrado**¶ **to be one of the planet’s biodiversity hotspots**, when combined with the threats which¶ it is facing. A recent checklist of vascular (i.e. flowering) plants in the biome¶ identified more than 11,000 species, of which around **44% are endemic** – that is, they¶ appear nowhere else in the world. **The Cerrado is estimated to contain some 5% of**¶ **the entire Earth’s biodiversity**.28¶ **The plant biodiversity and its long adaptation to adverse conditions make Cerrado vegetation of great interest** and potential high value **for** a wide range of human uses,¶ including for **medicines,** novel food **and** potentially even **crops better suited to future**¶ **conditions under climate change.**29¶ Among the charismatic mammal species to be found in the Cerrado are the giant¶ anteater, giant armadillo, maned wolf and jaguar. More than 800 bird species occur¶ in the biome30 – emblematic birds include the Toco toucan, the rhea or South¶ American ostrich, and various species of macaw.¶ Apart from the great biodiversity, the Cerrado’s position on the high plateau of the¶ continent gives it an important role in safeguarding the water resources of a large¶ part of Brazil and neighbouring countries. This has given it the nickname ‘Brazil’s¶ water tank’: of 12 hydrological regions in the country, six have sources in the Cerrado.¶ In the case of three major river basins – the Tocantins/Araguaia, São Francisco and¶ Paraná-Paraguay (La Plata) – more than 70% of the water resources originate in the¶ Cerrado. Although the Amazon River itself starts in the Andes, some 4% of the water¶ in the Amazon basin flows from tributaries originating in the Cerrado.31¶ **The Cerrado** also **has global importance because of the large stock of carbon stored in**¶ **its** vegetation and **soil.** **Although it would appear to be much sparser than the** well-known **carbon store of the Amazon**, **the Cerrado has been described as a forest**¶ **standing on its head, with** about **70% of biomass underground**.32 **Recent studies suggest the carbon stock of trees, bushes, litter, roots and soil may be nearly double the figure given by** the **I**ntergovernmental **P**anel on **C**limate **C**hange (2000), at some¶ 265 tonnes of carbon per hectare.33

**Warming is anthropogenic. We need *strong carbon sinks***

**Hu ‘9**

(et al – all authors listed. JIA HU = Department of Ecology and Evolutionary Biology, University of Colorado, Boulder. DAVID J. P. MOORE = Department of Geography, King’s College London. SEANP.BURNS = National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR). RUSSELL K . MONSON – Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES), University of Colorado, Boulder. “Longer growing seasons lead to less carbon sequestration by a subalpine forest” – Global Change Biology; http://www.mmm.ucar.edu/people/burns/files/gcb10\_hu\_growingseason.pdf)

Human activities, such as the **burning of fossil fuels** and¶ land use changes, **have increased** the atmospheric **CO2** concentration over the past century. **The increase** in CO¶ 2¶ and other greenhouse gases **is very likely to have caused climate warming** at unprecedented rates (IPCC,¶ 2007). **While** approximately **half of the emitted anthropogenic CO2** **stays in the atmosphere**, **the remainder is assimilated into terrestrial** and ocean **ecosystems** (Ca-¶ nadell¶ et al¶ ., 2007). **These natural carbon sinks are vital for sequestering** atmospheric **CO2** , **and yet the strength** and longevity **of these sinks may be diminishing** (Cramer¶ et al¶ ., 2001; Canadell¶ et al¶ ., 2007**). The tendency for ecosystem growing seasons to lengthen in response to climate warming (**Myneni¶ et al¶ ., 1997; Cao & Wood-¶ ward, 1998; Black¶ et al¶ ., 2000) **may enhance the strength of the terrestrial carbon sink**, **and thus diminish the rate of atmospheric CO2 buildup**. An earlier spring, and¶ associated longer growing season may increase the¶ potential time for photosynthetic CO¶ 2¶ uptake by terres-¶ trial ecosystems.

**Runaway CO2 concentration acidifies the oceans—the impact is extinction**

**Romm ‘9**

(Joe, a Fellow at American Progress and is the editor of Climate Progress, which **New York Times** columnist Tom Friedman called "the indispensable blog" and Time magazine named one of the 25 “Best Blogs of 2010.″ In 2009, **Rolling Stone** put Romm #88 on its list of 100 “people who are reinventing America.” **Time** named him a “Hero of the Environment″ and “The Web’s most influential climate-change blogger.” Romm was acting assistant secretary of energy for energy efficiency and renewable energy in 1997, where he oversaw $1 billion in R&D, demonstration, and deployment of low-carbon technology. He is a Senior Fellow at American Progress and holds a Ph.D. in physics from MIT, “Imagine a World without Fish: Deadly ocean acidification — hard to deny, harder to geo-engineer, but not hard to stop — is subject of documentary ,” http://thinkprogress.org/romm/2009/09/02/204589/a-sea-change-imagine-a-world-without-fish-ocean-acidification-film/, AM)

Global warming is “capable of wrecking the marine ecosystem and depriving future generations of the harvest of the seas” (see Ocean dead zones to expand, “remain for thousands of years”). A post on ocean acidification from the new Conservation Law Foundation blog has brought to my attention that the first documentary on the subject, *A Sea Change:* Imagine a World without Fish, is coming out. Ocean acidification must be a core climate message, since it **is** hard to deny and **impervious** **to** the delusion that **geoengineering** is the silver bullet. Indeed, a major 2009 study GRL study, “Sensitivity of ocean acidification to geoengineered climate stabilization” (subs. req’d), concluded: The results of this paper support the view that climate engineering will not resolve the problem of ocean acidification, and that therefore deep and rapid cuts in CO2 emissions are likely to be the most effective strategy to avoid environmental damage from future ocean acidification. If you want to understand ocean acidification better, see this BBC story, which explains: **Man-made pollution is raising ocean acidity at least 10 times faster than previously thought**, a study says. Or see this *Science* magazine study, “Evidence for Upwelling of Corrosive “Acidified” Water onto the Continental Shelf” (subs. req’), which found Our results show for the first time that a large section of the North American continental shelf is impacted by ocean acidification. Other continental shelf regions may also be impacted where anthropogenic CO2-enriched water is being upwelled onto the shelf. Or listen to the Australia’s ARC Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, which warns: The world’s oceans are becoming more acid, with potentially devastating consequences for corals and the marine organisms that build reefs and provide much of the Earth’s breathable oxygen. The acidity is caused by the gradual buildup of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere, dissolving into the oceans. Scientists fear it could be lethal for animals with chalky skeletons which make up more than a third of the planet’s marine life”¦. Corals and plankton with chalky skeletons are at the base of the marine food web. They rely on sea water saturated with calcium carbonate to form their skeletons. However, as acidity intensifies, the saturation declines, making it harder for the animals to form their skeletal structures (calcify). “Analysis of coral cores shows a steady drop in calcification over the last 20 years,” says Professor Ove Hoegh-Guldberg of CoECRS and the University of Queensland. “There’s not much debate about how it happens: put more CO2 into the air above and it dissolves into the oceans. “When CO2 levels in the atmosphere reach about 500 parts per million, you put calcification out of business in the oceans.” (Atmospheric CO2 levels are presently 385 ppm, up from 305 in 1960.) I’d like to see an analysis of what happens when you get to 850 to 1000+ ppm because that is where we’re headed (see U.S. media largely ignores latest warning from climate scientists: “Recent observations confirm “¦ the worst-case IPCC scenario trajectories (or even worse) are being realised” “” 1000 ppm). The CLF post notes: Dr. Jane Lubchenco, Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) warns that an acidic ocean is the “equally evil twin” of climate change. Scott Doney, a senior scientist at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution noted in a public presentation that “New England is the most vulnerable region in the country to ocean acidification.” In June, dozens of Academies of Science, including ours and China’s, issued a joint statement on ocean acidification, warned “Marine food supplies are likely to be reduced with significant implications for food production and security in regions dependent on fish protein, and human health and wellbeing” and “Ocean acidification is irreversible on timescales of **at least** tens of thousands of years.” They conclude: Ocean acidification is a direct consequence of increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations. To avoid substantial damage to ocean ecosystems, deep and rapid reductions of global CO2 emissions by at least 50% by 2050, and much more thereafter are needed. We, the academies of science working through the InterAcademy Panel on International Issues (IAP), call on world leaders to: “¢ Acknowledge that ocean acidification is a direct and real consequence of increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations, is already having an effect at current concentrations, and is likely to cause **grave harm to important marine ecosystems as CO2 concentrations reach 450 ppm and above;** “¢ Recognise that reducing the build up of CO2 in the atmosphere is the only practicable solution to mitigating ocean acidification; “¢ Within the context of the UNFCCC negotiations in the run up to Copenhagen 2009, recognise the direct threats posed by increasing atmospheric CO2 emissions to the oceans and therefore society, and take action to mitigate this threat; “¢ Implement action to reduce global CO2 emissions by at least 50% of 1990 levels by 2050 and continue to reduce them thereafter. If we want to save life in the oceans “” **and save ourselves**, since we depend on that life “” the time to start slashing carbon dioxide emissions is now.

**Plan**

**The United States Federal Government should lift all import restrictions on sugar cane ethanol produced in Cuba and facilitate growth of a Cuban sugar cane ethanol sector through foreign direct investment.**

**Contention Three – Solvency**

**Cuba would accept FDI for ethanol – Raul is for biofuels**

**Posner ‘8**

Andrew Posner – In 2007, Andy was an Environmental Studies Masters student at Brown University. He has gone on to be the Transportation correspondent for Treehugger.com – “Cuba: Can 'Red' Ethanol Be Green?” – Treehugger.com – February 25, 2008 – http://www.treehugger.com/cars/cuba-can-red-ethanol-be-green.html

After 49 years in power, **Fidel** Castro **has stepped aside and allowed** his brother **Raúl,** 76, **to be**come **president**. While hopes that "a younger generation might take power" have been washed away, many still expect to see changes with the "pragmatic military officer" in charge. **One change**s **may come in the form of an ethanol boom in Cuba**, where experts believe as much as 2 billions gallon could one day be produced annually, which would place Cuba third in worldwide production. According to Wired.com,¶ Fidel Castro hated ethanol. He thought it punished the poor by driving up food prices. But Cuba produces a lot of sugar, and **with** Fidel's brother **Raul - a fan of biofuels** - **expected to call the shots, Cuba could become a key player in the global ethanol game.**¶ Of course, **Cuba wouldn't be able to start producing all that ethanol without "a huge investment in Cuba's rickety sugar industry." And doing so will require** the kind of **reform** that has helped make China the powerhouse that it is: **namely, foreign investment. This kind of reform may not be as unlikely as it sounds.** According to a Washington Post article entitled 'End of Castro's Rule Opens Door for Reforms,' "**Cuba's leaders likely will "want to pursue an incremental, gradual approach to reform**" that does not privatize the large state-run sector but allows a new private sector to grow alongside it." Oh, and by the way, **Cuba has been modernizing its ethanol infrastructure, albeit quietly**.

**Energy cooperation is key – the plan specifically solves our relations**

**Colvin, Jaffe, Soligo 09**

(Jake Colvin- Vice President for Global Trade Issues at the National Foreign Trade Council and

directs the Cuba Initiative of USA, Amy Myers Jaffe - research scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy, whose focus is on oil geopolitics and strategic energy policy, and Dr. Ronald Soligo - professor of economics at Rice University and a Rice Scholar at the Baker Institute research focuses on economic growth and development and energy economics, “9 WAYS FOR U.S. TO TALK TO CUBA AND FOR CUBA TO TALK TO US”

The Center for Democracy in the Americas (CDA), http://democracyinamericas.org/pdfs/9-Ways-for-US-to-talk-to-Cuba-and-for-Cuba-to-talk-to-US.pdf)

There are numerous topics of global and mutual interest to talk about. nine **The Center for Democracy in the Americas has identified** **critical areas where Washington and Havana can communicate, work together and build relationships of confidence and trust**.¶ **Energy cooperation: The expertise of the U.S. energy industry could** speed Cuba’s development of abundant untapped oil resources, **increase Cuba’s ability to produce ethanol, boost energy supplies to the U.S., and help Cuba’s economy.¶** Commercial cooperation: **Opportunities for trade and commerce with Cuba would help U.S. firms compete against foreign firms, which operate in Cuba without restrictions, while improving Cuban living standards** and working conditions.¶

# 2AC

## Oil Dependence

**Prolif decreases the risk of war—robust statistical, empirical evidence proves.**

**Asal and Beardsley 7** (Victor, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—SUNY Albany, and Kyle, Assistant Prof. Pol. Sci.—Emory U., Journal of Peace Research, “Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior,” 44:2, Sage)

As Model 1 in Table IV illustrates, all of our variables are statistically significant except for the protracted conflict variable. Our primary independent variable, the number of nuclear actors involved in the crisis, has a negative relationship with the severity of violence and is significant. This lends preliminary support to the argument that **nuclear weapons have a restraining affect on crisis behavior**, as stated in H1. It should be noted that, of the crises that involved four nuclear actors—Suez Nationalization War (1956), Berlin Wall (1961), October Yom Kippur War (1973), and Iraq No-Fly Zone (1992)—and five nuclear actors—Gulf War (1990)—only two are not full-scale wars. While this demonstrates that the pacifying effect of more nuclear actors is not strong enough to prevent war in all situations, it does not necessarily weaken the argument that there is actually a pacifying effect. The positive and statistically significant coefficient on the variable that counts the number of crisis actors has a magnitude greater than that on the variable that counts the number of nuclear actors. Since increases in the number of overall actors in a crisis are strongly associated with higher levels of violence, it should be no surprise that many of the conflicts with many nuclear actors—by extension, many general actors as well—experienced war. Therefore, the results can only suggest that, keeping the number of crisis actors fixed, increasing the proportion of nuclear actors has a pacifying effect. They do not suggest that adding nuclear actors to a crisis will decrease the risk of high levels violence; but rather, adding more actors of any type to a crisis can have a destabilizing effect. Also in Table IV, Model 2 demonstrates that the effect of a nuclear dyad is only approaching statistical significance, but does have a sign that indicates higher levels of violence are less likely in crises with opponents that have nuclear weapons than other crises. This lukewarm result suggests that it might not be necessary for nuclear actors to face each other in order to get the effect of decreased propensity for violence. **All actors should tend to be more cautious in escalation when there is a nuclear opponent, regardless of their own capabilities**. While this might weaken support for focusing on specifically a ‘balance of terror’ as a source of stability (see Gaddis, 1986; Waltz, 1990; Sagan & Waltz, 2003; Mearsheimer, 1990), **it supports the logic in this article that nuclear weapons** can serve as a **deter**rent of **aggression from both nuclear and non-nuclear opponents**.6 Model 3 transforms the violence variable to a binary indicator of war and demonstrates that the principal relationship between the number of nuclear actors and violence holds for the most crucial outcome of full-scale war. Model 4 demonstrates that accounting for the presence of new nuclear actors does not greatly change the results. The coefficient on the new nuclear actor variable is statistically insignificant, which lends credence to the optimists’ view that new nuclear-weapon states should not be presupposed to behave less responsibly than the USA, USSR, UK, France, and China did during the Cold War. Finally, Model 5 similarly illustrates that crises involving superpowers are not more or less prone to violence than others. Superpower activity appears to not be driving the observed relationships between the number of nuclear-crisis actors and restraint toward violence. It is important to establish more specifically what the change in the probability of full-scale war is when nuclear actors are involved. Table V presents the probability of different levels of violence as the number of nuclear actors increases in the Clarify simulations. The control variables are held at their modes or means, with the exception of the variable that counts the number of crisis actors. Because it would be impossible to have, say, five nuclear-crisis actors and only two crisis actors, the number of crisis actors is held constant at five. As we can see, the impact of an increase in the number of nuclear actors is substantial. Starting from a crisis situation without any nuclear actors, including one nuclear actor (out of five) reduces the likelihood of fullscale war by nine percentage points. As we continue to add nuclear actors, the likelihood of full-scale war declines sharply, so that the probability of a war with the maximum number of nuclear actors is about three times less than the probability with no nuclear actors. In addition, the probabilities of no violence and only minor clashes increase substantially as the number of nuclear actors increases. The probability of serious clashes is relatively constant. **Overall, the analysis lends significant support to the more optimistic proliferation argument related to the expectation of violent conflict when nuclear actors are involved**. While the presence of nuclear powers does not prevent war, it significantly reduces the probability of full-scale war, with more reduction as the number of nuclear powers involved in the conflict increases. As mentioned, concerns about selection effects in deterrence models, as raised by Fearon (2002), should be taken seriously. While we control for the strategic selection of serious threats within crises, we are unable to control for the non-random initial initiation of a crisis in which the actors may choose to enter a crisis based on some ex ante assessment of the outcomes. To account for possible selection bias caused by the use of a truncated sample that does not include any non-crisis cases, one would need to use another dataset in which the crisis cases are a subset and then run Heckman type selection models (see Lemke & Reed, 2001). It would, however, be difficult to think of a different unit of analysis that might be employed, such that the set of crises is a subset of a larger category of interaction. While dyadyear datasets have often been employed to similar ends, the key independent variable here, which is specific to crises as the unit of analysis, does not lend itself to a dyadic setup. Moreover, selection bias concerns are likely not valid in disputing the claims of this analysis. If selection bias were present, it would tend to bias the effect of nuclear weapons downward, because the set of observed crises with nuclear actors likely has a disproportionate share of resolved actors that have chosen to take their chances against a nuclear opponent. Despite this potential mitigating bias, the results are statistically significant, which strengthens the case for the explanations provided in this study.

**Deterrence failure is very unlikely. Proliferation saves far more lives than it costs.**

**Preston 7** (Thomas, Associate Prof. IR—Washington State U. and Faculty Research Associate—Moynihan Institute of Global Affairs, “From Lambs to Lions: Future Security relationships in a World of Biological and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 31-32)

1.) The Cost of Deterrence Failure Is Too Great Advocates of deterrence seldom take the position that it will always work or that it cannot fail. Rather, they take the position that if one can achieve the requisite elements required to achieve a stable deterrent relationship between parties, **it vastly decreases the chances of miscalculation and resorting to war—even in contexts where it might otherwise be expected to occur** (George and Smoke 1974; Harvey 1997a; Powell 1990, 2003; Goldstein 2000). Unfortunately, critics of deterrence take the understandable, if unrealistic, position that if deterrence cannot be 100 percent effective under all circumstances, then it is an unsound strategic approach for states to rely upon, especially considering the immense destructiveness of nuclear weapons. Feaver (1993, 162), for example, criticizes reliance on nuclear deterrence because it can fail and that rational deterrence theory can only predict that peace should occur most of the time (e.g., Lebow and Stein 1989). Yet, were we to apply this standard of perfection to most other policy approaches concerning security matters — whether it be arms control or proliferation regime efforts, military procurement policies, alliance formation strategies, diplomacy, or sanctions —none could be argued with any more certainty to completely remove the threat of equally devastating wars either. Indeed, one could easily make the argument that **these alternative means have shown themselves historically to be far less effective than nuclear arms in preventing wars**. Certainly, the twentieth century was replete with examples of devastating conventional conflicts which were not deterred through nonnuclear measures. Although the potential costs of a nuclear exchange between small states would indeed cause a frightful loss of life, it would be no more costly (and likely far less so) than large-scale conventional conflicts have been for combatants. Moreover, if nuclear deterrence raises the potential costs of war high enough for policy makers to want to avoid (rather than risk) conflict, it is just as legitimate (if not more so) for optimists to argue in **favor of nuclear deterrence in terms of the lives saved through the avoidance of far more likely recourses to conventional wars**, as it is for pessimists to warn of the potential costs of deterrence failure. And, while some accounts describing the "immense weaknesses" of deterrence theory (Lebow and Stein 1989, 1990) would lead one to believe deterrence was almost impossible to either obtain or maintain, since 1945 there has not been one single historical instance of nuclear deterrence failure (especially when this notion is limited to threats to key central state interests like survival, and not to minor probing of peripheral interests). Moreover, the actual costs of twentieth-century conventional conflicts have been staggeringly immense, especially when compared to the actual costs of nuclear conflicts (for example, 210,000 fatalities in the combined 1945 Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombings compared to 62 million killed overall during World War II, over three million dead in both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, etc.) (McKinzie et al. 2001, 28).3 Further, as Gray (1999, 158-59) observes, "it is improbable that policymakers anywhere need to be educated as to the extraordinary qualities and quantities of nuclear armaments." Indeed, the high costs and uncontestable, immense levels of destruction that would be caused by nuclear weapons have been shown historically to be facts that have not only been readily apparent and salient to a wide range of policy makers, but ones that **have clearly been demonstrated to moderate extreme policy or risk-taking behavior** (Blight 1992; Preston 2001) Could it go wrong? Of course. There is always that potential with human beings in the loop. Nevertheless, it has also been shown to be effective at moderating policy maker behavior and introducing an element of constraint into situations that otherwise would likely have resulted in war (Hagerty 1998).

## Brazil

## China SOI

Cuba isn’t zero sum

**Hearn 9** – Adrian is a research fellow at the School of Social and Political Sciences, the University of Sydney, (“Cuba and China: Lessons and Opportunities for the United States”, June 2009, http://cri.fiu.edu/research/commissioned-reports/cuba-china-hearn.pdf)//sawyer

For the United States, the value added by the above process lies in its promotion of trilateral cooperation. **Both China and the United States favor more open markets in Cuba**, and considering the attempts of Chinese enterprises to build Cuba’s export capacities and develop its transport, manufacturing, and resource sectors, the United States is a logical source of management services and marketing expertise. Building on existing U.S. activities in agriculture, medicine, and telecommunications, expansion into these sectors would bring both economic benefits for U.S. firms and opportunities for harmonizing approaches to governance and information sharing. Indeed, the Obama administration’s relatively conciliatory stance toward Cuba could lay the foundation of a much-needed “mutually reinforcing diplomacy” with China in the region (Wilder 2009:4). **A defining challenge for U.S. foreign policy in the 21st century will be the development of mutually beneficial partnerships with China**. With sensible diplomacy, **Chinese projects in Latin America could become a source of deeper cooperation,** for as Daniel Erikson concisely put it to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, “**trade is not a zero sum game**” (2008:3). Hu **Jintao’s proposal at the 2009 G-20 to jointly develop financial monitoring mechanisms reflects China’s desire for cooperative relations with the United States.** With legal authorization, Cuba could become a platform for advancing responsibly governed trilateral projects that demonstrate awareness of regional diversity and a commitment to international cooperation. Accommodating diversity is critical to effective diplomacy, for although Confucius may have stated, “have no friends not equal to yourself”, in his pragmatic wisdom he also taught his followers to be “firm in the right way, and not merely firm.”

US influence inevitable

**Valencia, 7/10** – foreign affairs analyst and is a contributing writer for the World Policy Institute and Global Voices Online. (Robert, "US and China: The Fight for Latin America," Stratrisk, 7-10-13, http://stratrisks.com/geostrat/13916)//SMS

The United States hasn’t lost Latin America, and is unlikely to lose it completely. It is still the region’s top trade partner. The United States has recently signed free-trade agreements with Colombia and Panama, and maintains other trade agreements with Peru, Chile, and Mexico. Central American and several Caribbean countries rely upon U.S. military cooperation in an attempt to curtail drug trade. Nevertheless, the post 9/11 years severely eroded U.S.-Latin American relations as the Bush administration focused heavily on the war on terror, often ignoring issues in Latin America.

China will use LA influence to destroy Taiwan’s legitimacy

**Congressional Research Service, 08**- Nonpartisan agency within the Library of Congress (“CHINA’S FOREIGN POLICY AND ‘‘SOFT POWER’’ IN SOUTH AMERICA, ASIA, AND AFRICA”, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE, April 2008, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2008\_rpt/crs-china.pdf)//TL

OVERVIEW China’s growing interest in Latin America and the Caribbean is a fairly new phenomenon that has developed over the past several years. Beginning in April 2001 with President Jiang Zemin’s 13- day tour of Latin America, a succession of senior Chinese officials have visited Latin American countries to court regional governments, while Latin American leaders also have been frequent visitors in Beijing. China’s primary interest in the region appears to be to gain greater access to needed resources—such as various ores, soybeans, copper, iron and steel, and oil—through increased trade and investment. It is also likely that Beijing’s additional goal is to isolate Taiwan by luring the 12 Latin American and Caribbean nations still maintaining diplomatic relations with Taiwan to shift their diplomatic recognition to China. While China’s economic linkages with Latin America have grown, the U.S. advantage of geographical proximity means that the PRC presence is likely to remain dwarfed by U.S. trade with and investment in the region. Moreover, although many Latin American countries welcome Chinese investment, some have viewed China as an economic threat, and are concerned that both their domestic industries and their U.S. export markets will be overwhelmed by Chinese competition. Nevertheless, some analysts maintain that Beijing’s growing role in the region may have longer-term implications for U.S. regional interests and influence. DIPLOMACY- Bilateral Relations and Competition With Taiwan Of the 33 independent countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region, China currently has official diplomatic relations with 21, while the remaining 12 nations maintain relations with Taiwan (see Table 1). For ideological reasons, Communist Cuba was the first nation in the region to recognize China back in 1960, while Chile under Socialist President Salvador Allende was the second in 1970. Mexico established relations with China in 1972, and most South America nations did so in the 1970s and 1980s, including Argentina and Brazil, which were run by military dictatorships at the time. In addition to Cuba, nine other Caribbean nations have diplomatic relations with the PRC, five of which have had relations since the 1970s. Over the years, China has signed a variety of bilateral partnership agreements with several countries in the region in order to strengthen relations. The most politically significant of these are known as ‘‘strategic partnership agreements.’’ To date, China has signed such agreements with Brazil (1993), Venezuela (2001), Mexico (2003), and Argentina (2004). Additional ‘‘cooperative partnership’’ or ‘‘friendly and cooperative partnership’’ agreements have been signed with Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Ecuador, Jamaica, and Peru.26 In the 1980s, China began to augment its expertise on Latin America through agreements for Chinese officials to travel to the region to study Spanish, and through the development of think tanks such as the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and the Department of Studies about Latin America of the Chinese Communist Party.27 For many of the region’s nations, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America, there has been a political dynamic in China’s expanding economic linkages and foreign assistance. China, with some success, has been trying to woo countries away from recognizing Taiwan. Taiwan’s official relations in the region now include five Central American countries, six in the Caribbean, and one in South America. For decades, Taiwan was a consistent provider of financial assistance and investment in Latin America and the Caribbean in order to nurture its remaining official relationships, a policy often referred to as checkbook or dollar diplomacy. But Taipei now is hard- pressed to compete against the growing economic and diplomatic clout of China, which in recent years has stepped up its own version of checkbook diplomacy. Since 2004, three countries in the region have switched their diplomatic recognition from Taiwan to the PRC: Dominica in March 2004, Grenada in January 2005, and most recently, Costa Rica in June 2007. Dominica severed relations with Taiwan in 2004 after Beijing trumped Taiwan’s $9 million in assistance with a pledge of $122 million in assistance to the tiny country over six years.28 Grenada switched its recognition to China in the aftermath of Hurricane Ivan that devastated the island in September 2004 and destroyed a new cricket stadium that Taiwan had helped build. Disappointed about Taiwan’s response after the hurricane, Grenadian Prime Minister visited China and received support for the rebuilding of the cricket stadium, with workers supplied by China, as well as other grants, support for the agricultural sector, and scholarships. Most recently, Costa Rica under President Oscar Arias switched diplomatic recognition to China in June 2007 in large part because of growing trade relations in recent years and the prospect for increased Chinese trade and investment. China is now Costa Rica’s second largest trading partner, after the United States, and the two countries are considering a free trade agreement. China’s overtures in the Caribbean experienced a setback in May 2007 when St. Lucia switched its diplomatic recognition back to Taiwan after ten years of recognizing the PRC. The diplomatic switch was related to the ouster of Prime Minister Kenny Anthony’s St. Lucia Labour Party (SLP) from power in December 2006, and the election of a new government led by the United Workers Party (UWP). (In 1997, the ruling SLP government under Anthony had orchestrated a diplomatic switch from Taiwan to China.) Taiwan’s promises of assistance to the new UWP government in 2007 includes support for public health, education (including the provision of computers and scholarships), and development of the agricultural sector.

Risks Taiwan war

**Fergusson ‘12** (Robbie, Researcher at Royal Society for the Arts, Featured Contributor at International Business Times, Former Conference & Research Assistant at Security Watch, Former Researcher at University College London, Master of Science, China in the International Arena, The University of Glasgow, “The Chinese Challenge to the Monroe Doctrine,” http://www.e-ir.info/2012/07/23/does-chinese-growth-in-latin-america-threaten-american-interests)

On the other hand, for the PRC, every state which withdraws its support for the ROC takes it one step closer to being in a position where it can resolve the ‘**Taiwan issue’ unilaterally**. Subsequently, undermining Taiwan is of the utmost importance to China, and it has taken to ‘outbidding’ Taiwan in offers of foreign aid, a strategy made possible by the decline in aid from the defunct Soviet Union, and the West, which is pre occupied with terrorism and the Middle East. Li notes that “the region’s leaders have turned to Asia for help to promote trade and financial assistance, and consequently played the PRC and Taiwan against each other.” [53] Despite its smaller size, Taiwan has fared remarkably well in this bidding war; focusing its aid investments on infrastructure such as stadiums in St Kitts & Nevis for the Cricket World Cup in 2007.¶ However, even Taiwan‘s economy can be put under strain by the seemingly relentless stream of foreign aid which has brought only debateable and mild gains to the Taiwanese cause. This has contributed to the PRC picking off the few remaining supporters of the ROC – take for example, the Dominican case.¶ In early 2004, Commonwealth of Dominica asked Taipei for a $58 million aid, which is unrelated to public welfare. The Caribbean nation had relied on Taiwan to develop its agriculture-based economy since 1983. Diplomatic relationship was soon broken after Taipei turned down the request. [54]¶ This incident showcased the fact that in economic terms, the PRC is winning the battle for Latin America.¶ Political strategies of the PRC¶ In political terms too; the PRC is in an advantageous position, thanks in part again to its position within the UN. While it can be argued that China “provides incentives but does not threaten harm to induce countries to defect from recognizing Taiwan,” [55] the reality is that the use of force and direct harm are not the only means available to an economic entity as powerful as China. It refuses to maintain official relations with any state that recognises the ROC; an action which can be quite prohibitive to the country being able to take advantage of the growing Chinese market. Although Domínguez suggests that the PRC “has not been punitive toward those states that still recognize the Republic of China (Taiwan),” [56] the legitimacy of this claim has to be brought into question – for example “in June 1996, China fought the extension of the UN mission in Haiti, to punish the Caribbean nation for its appeal for UN acceptance of Taiwan.” [57] This incident showed that China is prepared to use its global clout to play spoiler and apply indirect pressure on countries to adopt its position. Similarly, China’s experience with one-party rule has taught it the importance of party-to-party relations in addition to state-to-state relations, further cementing the PRC by establishing a relationship based on goodwill and common understanding. Indeed by the start of 1998 “the CCP had established relations with almost all major political parties in the countries that were Taiwan’s diplomatic allies in Latin America,” [58] further isolating the ROC.¶ The effect on American interests¶ Were the ROC to be deserted by its remaining allies in Latin America, the USA would be disadvantaged in attempting to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. A Taiwan that was not recognised by any state from the Americas, or Europe (with the exception of the Vatican) would not be seen as a genuine sovereign entity whose defence would be more important than the upkeep of good relations between China and the West. As China’s economic and political position in the world improves vis-à-vis both America and Taiwan, so might its ambitions. The U.S.A might find itself in a position where it could no longer withstand the diplomatic pressure to allow the PRC to conclude a settlement on Taiwan, **perhaps by force**.

Extinction

**Global Times, 11**- Major Chinese English newspaper. Interviewer: GT reporter Wang Wenwen. Lu Yuan is deputy secretary-general of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences and Robert Farley is a professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce in the University of Kentucky. (“Sino-US war unlikely but not impossible”, Global Times, 11/15/11, http://www.globaltimes.cn/NEWS/tabid/99/ID/684012/Sino-US-war-unlikely-but-not-impossible.aspx)//TL

Editor's Note:

A recent report released by the RAND Corporation, a US think tank specializing in military studies, examined the prospect of China and the US going to war, but concluded it improbable. What is the ultimate red line for a major military conflict between the two powers? Will the US back other Asian countries in provoking China? Global Times (GT) reporter Wang Wenwen talked to Major General Luo Yuan (Luo), deputy secretary-general of the PLA Academy of Military Sciences, and Robert M. Farley (Farley), a professor at the Patterson School of Diplomacy and International Commerce in the University of Kentucky, on these issues. GT: Some people predict that China will be a real competitor for the US in the next few decades. Do you think a war between China and the US will ever occur? If it does occur, what can be the trigger? Luo: At the current stage, both countries don't have the desire to start a war, nor do they have the capability. However, if China's core interests such as its sovereignty, national security and unity are intruded on, a military conflict will be unavoidable. Farley: I think that war is unlikely, but not impossible. Both countries have a lot to lose, both from the conflict itself and the overall fallout. If war does occur, I suspect that the trigger will be a miscalculation over Taiwan, or possibly North Korea. Some in the US might feel compelled to defend Taiwan following a declaration of independence; a North Korean collapse will lead to competition over the new structure of politics on the Korean Peninsula. The first and most important consequence is that Americans and Chinese will die. Robert M. Farley GT: What will be the consequence if a military conflict happens? Luo: The war could cause destruction to both sides, with the US having more to lose. China is the largest foreign holder of US debt. The US dare not irritate China easily, and China is also tied to the US. If a war starts, the two countries will suffer economic losses immediately. As both countries have nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the consequence will be disastrous if the war escalates. Farley: The first and most important consequence is that Americans and Chinese will die. Another major consequence will be a severing of the US-China economic relationship no matter who wins the war, which could induce another global financial collapse and throw much of the world into a very severe recession. GT: The RAND report says the war may start over China's border countries or regions like North Korea, India, the South China Sea or Taiwan Straits. Do you think so? Luo: The US is a pragmatic country. It will try to trigger a war in other countries or regions to deplete their powers while maintaining its own safety. The US will not really get involved into a war if the harm is greater than the benefits. Even if it does get involved, it won't sacrifice itself for its allies. Farley: I doubt that the US will become engaged in the South China Sea in any but a supporting role. However, the Taiwan situation is ripe for miscalculation by all the parties involved. I'm a bit less worried about either India or North Korea. While the US and India have been building a good relationship, the focus of Indian foreign policy remains on Pakistan, and previous Indo-Pakistani wars haven't dragged either China or the US in. In North Korea, I'm optimistic that diplomats will be able to work out the major issues without war. GT: Will the US draw China's neighboring countries to its side to rival with China? Luo: Definitely. The US has already display its power through China's neighboring countries. For example, it has conducted naval exercises amid growing tensions with China over disputed waters in the South China Sea. It sells arms worth millions of dollars to India as a sign of its desire to deepen defense cooperation with that nation. Farley: The US will definitely attempt to rely on some of its allies. If North Korea does become a flashpoint, Japan is quite likely to become involved, as well as South Korea. Naval conflict in the South China Sea would almost certainly involve Vietnam and the Philippines. The big question mark is Taiwan, where it's unclear that anyone but the US would be interested in defending the island. Japan has substantial economic connections with Taiwan island, but then it also has such connections with the Chinese mainland. The US will not really get involved into a war if the harm is greater than the benefits. Luo Yuan GT: Some US military sources say the US can easily destroy China's small nuclear arsenal. What do you think? Can a nuclear war ever happen? Luo: This is not the first time that the Americans have made such crazy remarks. It should be noted that everybody is vulnerable to nuclear attack. Although China has pledged no first-use of nuclear weapons, it will not keep them just on display in life-and-death moments for the nation. Farley: I think the Chinese nuclear arsenal is very vulnerable to US attack right now, and probably will remain so for some time. However, I also think that the US would be extremely reluctant to start a nuclear war. The problem is again miscalculation. If China believes that the US is likely to launch an attack on its nuclear forces, it might be inclined to use those assets to pre-empt the US attack.

Structural factors ensure Chinese soft power will fail

**Keck, 1/7** – assistant editor of The Diplomat (Zachary, "Destined To Fail: China’s Soft Power Push," The Diplomat, 1-7-13, http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/07/destined-to-fail-chinas-soft-power-offensive/?all=true)//SMS

Yet even as China inaugurated its first organization dedicated to enhancing Beijing’s soft power, a number of disparate events in China were illustrating why the CCP’s charm offensive is doomed to fail. For example, in recent weeks the Chinese government has redoubled its efforts to censor the internet. [After social media users](http://thediplomat.com/china-power/the-curious-case-of-zhan-haite/) in China exposed a series of scandals involving low-level government officials, the CCP adopted new regulations that require internet service providers to quickly delete “illegal” posts and turn over the evidence to government officials. Additionally, after trying to require citizens to use their real names on social media sites like Weibo, the new regulations require citizens to use their real identities when signing up with an internet provider. More secretly, according to many inside China, authorities have been strengthening the great firewall to prevent users from employing various methods in order to gain access to a growing number of sites that are banned. China is hardly the only government concerned about the political instability unfettered internet access can generate. In fact, last month [China joined](http://news.yahoo.com/un-telecom-chief-surprised-us-led-treaty-snub-110120544--finance.html) 89 countries in supporting a United Nations telecommunications treaty that over 20 nations opposed over fears that it would open the door to greater government control over cyberspace. But while China’s suppression of information may resonate with political elites in authoritarian states, the world is living in the information age and attempts to restrict the flow of information for political reasons will not endear China to the global masses that soft power seeks to attract. China’s internet policies also conflict with the stated goals of its soft power offensive in more concrete ways as well. For example, one of the primary goals of the CPDA is to increase the number of people-to-people exchanges with other countries. However, if the CCP is successful in preventing users from accessing popular sites like Facebook, Twitter, You Tube, and the New York Times, it is likely to discourage foreigners from living or [studying abroad in China](http://thediplomat.com/china-power/beijing%E2%80%99s-study-abroad-market/). Similarly, blocking access to these sites inhibits communication between Chinese and foreigners over cyberspace. Along with tighter restrictions on the Internet, Chinese authorities have also increased their scrutiny on media outlets, both domestic and foreign. Domestically, the CCP ushered in the New Year by [closing down](http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1120153/yanhuang-chunqiu-website-closed-down-after-editorial-constitution) the fiercely liberal magazine, Yanhuang Chunqiu, ostensibly because its registration had been invalid since August 2010. Then, on Friday, 51 prominent journalists [issued an open letter](http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/01/04/30311/) demanding the resignation of Tuo Zhen, the Communist Party’s propaganda chief in Guangdong Province, who they accused of “raping” the Southern Weekly’s editorial page when he allegedly altered its annual New Year’s Greeting right as it went to press, and without the knowledge or consent of the editor. The journalists were later joined by over two dozen prominent academics from the Chinese mainland, Hong Kong, and Taiwan who published their own open letter calling for Tuo's resignation. Southern Weekly (also referred to as Southern Weekend) is a highly regarded reform-minded Guangdong newspaper, and its annual New Year’s Greeting has traditionally pushed the bounds of acceptable political discussion in China. [This year’s editorial originally](http://cmp.hku.hk/2013/01/03/30247/) parodied [Xi Jinping’s "Chinese Dream"](http://thediplomat.com/china-power/xi-jinpings-chinese-dream/) by calling for the realization of the “dream of constitutionalism in China” where civil rights and [the rule-of-law are respected](http://thediplomat.com/china-power/rule-of-law-in-china-past-present-and-future/) and upheld. After Tuo’s changes, the editorial expressed gratitude to the Communist Party for helping the country achieve the Chinese Dream. [According to David Bandurski](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424127887323689604578221471505782816.html), editor of [China Media Project](http://cmp.hku.hk/), "This kind of direct hands-on interference is really something new” and extreme even by China's strict regulation of domestic media. Indeed, after the government tried to silence the growing outrage over Tuo's actions, including by shutting down Southern Weekly staff members' personal Weibo accounts, the entire editorial staff at the newspaper decided to stage a strike, marking the first time in over two decades that the editorial staff of a major Chinese newspaper has gone on strike over government censorship, [according to](http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1121660/southern-weekend-censorship-row-escalates-staff-strike-hundreds-sign) the South China Morning Post. China also continued its campaign against foreign journalists and news organizations last week when Chris Buckley, an Australian-national and China correspondent for the New York Times, was forced to leave the country [because Beijing](http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/31/is-china-retaliating-against-western-journalists/) wouldn’t renew his visa. Following Buckley’s departure the New York Times said its China bureau chief, Philip PPan—author of [Out of Mao’s Shadow](http://www.outofmaosshadow.com/)—has been waiting since March to receive his own credentials. Beijing later claimed Buckley hadn’t submitted the proper paperwork, but his case follows on the heels of Al Jazeera’s Melissa Chan’s [expulsion from the](http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/14/local/la-me-Melissa-Chan-20120514) country and the Washington Post’s Andrew Higgins [finally ending](http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/citydesk/2012/09/17/posts-chinese-visa-fight-ends-with-a-whimper/) his three-year quest to gain reentry into China, which failed even after the newspaper enlisted the help of Henry Kissinger. Thus, the more plausible explanation for Buckley’s inability to renew his visa is that Beijing is retaliating against foreign journalists because of the extraordinary reporting organizations like the New York Times have been doing on politically taboo subjects in China, such as [stories on the enormous amount of wealth](http://thediplomat.com/china-power/wen-jiabaos-riches-and-political-reform-in-china/) the families of senior leaders have accumulated. This reporting is also why the websites of the New York Times and Bloomberg News [are no longer accessible](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/10/26/world/asia/china-blocks-web-access-to-new-york-times.html?_r=0) in China, and why reporters from these organizations [weren’t able](http://rendezvous.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/11/15/we-were-excluded-from-xis-big-moment-but-heard-his-first-words/) to attend the unveiling of the [Politburo Standing Committee at the 18th Party Congress](http://thediplomat.com/2012/11/16/chinas-new-leadership-unveiled/) in November. its ability to tolerate (much less cultivate) South Korean rapper Psy, and the “flash mobs” he’s inspired in places as varied as [Jakarta](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZ2hFlLMBg4), [Bangkok](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EKjOb4o8eiA), [Sydney](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xD9vM6v6JJ8), [Dhaka](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4WRTSkEPzNk), [Mumbai](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kihryyOcY8k), [Dubai](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=quE35Ak9_4Q),[American](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sdRm4hhb8wY) [college](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BcBdDo2A1pc) [campuses](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kWetGqX9uFc) and [shopping](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDEYzMRMsVk) [malls](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OGtO_XU5yTI), [Taipei](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4SnfA5OKoHQ), [Hong Kong](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFg1JiY_R1o), and, yes, the [Chinese](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3c-2shTqPis) [mainland](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jw5gPSnvaLw). to export its cultural products, as Peng Kan, the author of the op-ed rightly notes, through official communication channel. Indeed, it’s telling that China’s most popular non-governmental figures abroad are all opponents of the CCP. One such individual is democracy advocate Liu Xiaobo, who celebrated his 57th birthday on December 28th and the [3rd anniversary](http://www.hrichina.org/content/360) of being sentenced to an 11-year prison term on December 25th. This sentence only increased Liu’s international stature where he has been celebrated widely and awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 (which the CCP responded to by placing his wife under house arrest). Indeed Liu’s international renowned was on display last month when 134 Nobel laureates [sent Xi Jinping a letter](http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/nobel-laureates-urge-china-release-jailed-peace-prize-winner-liu-xiaobo-article-1.1213088) urging him to release Liu. Eclipsing Liu in popularity at least in the West, however, is Ai Weiwei, the famous Chinese artist and dissident. Ai Weiwei’s remarkable artistic talent made him famous in some circles, initially including the CCP and across the globe before his turn to social activism. It is undeniable, however, that [much of his popularity](http://thediplomat.com/china-power/ai-weiwei-help-floods-in/) has come from his courageous and witty challenge to Communist Party rule in China. It is this charismatic political dissent that explains why documentaries of him [win at Sundance](http://aiweiweineversorry.com/), Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times [interviews him](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/opinion/sunday/kristof-hitting-china-with-humor.html?_r=0) while visiting China, and his “[Gangam Style](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n281GWfT1E8)” parody becomes an instant You Tube sensation, despite the fact that [its underlying](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/10/24/explaining-ai-weiweis-grass-mud-horse-obsession/) political message is lost on almost all its viewers. hardly alone in In fact, this problem is practically inherent in authoritarian states (just ask Vladimir Putin). and David and Goliath is one of the most recognizable stories from Jewish and Christian religious texts. But this fact does not make Liu and Ai Weiwei any less damaging to the CCP’s ability to project soft power. and the soft power individuals like Ai Weiwei command under the current political leadership. Pan—author of [Out of Mao’s Shadow](http://www.outofmaosshadow.com/)—has been waiting since March to receive his own credentials. Beijing later claimed Buckley hadn’t submitted the proper paperwork, but his case follows on the heels of Al Jazeera’s Melissa Chan’s [expulsion from the](http://articles.latimes.com/2012/may/14/local/la-me-Melissa-Chan-20120514) country and the Washington Post’s Andrew Higgins [finally ending](http://www.washingtoncitypaper.com/blogs/citydesk/2012/09/17/posts-chinese-visa-fight-ends-with-a-whimper/) his three-year quest to gain reentry into China, which failed even after the newspaper enlisted the help of Henry Kissinger. 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One needs only to look to South Korean rapper Psy, and the “flash mobs” he’s inspired in places as varied as [Jakarta](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CZ2hFlLMBg4), [Bangkok](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EKjOb4o8eiA), [Sydney](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=xD9vM6v6JJ8), [Dhaka](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4WRTSkEPzNk), [Mumbai](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kihryyOcY8k), [Dubai](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=quE35Ak9_4Q),[American](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sdRm4hhb8wY) [college](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BcBdDo2A1pc) [campuses](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kWetGqX9uFc) and [shopping](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bDEYzMRMsVk) [malls](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OGtO_XU5yTI), [Taipei](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4SnfA5OKoHQ), [Hong Kong](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SFg1JiY_R1o), and, yes, the [Chinese](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3c-2shTqPis) [mainland](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jw5gPSnvaLw). A country as large and dynamic as China undoubtedly has many potential worldwide celebrities. And yet, as a China Daily op-ed [points out](http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-10/26/content_15848007.htm), China “is still far from making a product like Gangnam Style. China does export a large amount of cultural products every year, but few of them become popular abroad.” The major reason China fails to export its cultural products, as Peng Kan, the author of the op-ed rightly notes, is that “Government organizations and enterprises are the main force behind the exports….But these organizations and enterprises… cannot promote satires like Gangnam Style through official communication channel. But cultural products without entertainment value rarely become popular in overseas markets.” Indeed, it’s telling that China’s most popular non-governmental figures abroad are all opponents of the CCP. One such individual is democracy advocate Liu Xiaobo, who celebrated his 57th birthday on December 28th and the [3rd anniversary](http://www.hrichina.org/content/360) of being sentenced to an 11-year prison term on December 25th. This sentence only increased Liu’s international stature where he has been celebrated widely and awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010 (which the CCP responded to by placing his wife under house arrest). Indeed Liu’s international renowned was on display last month when 134 Nobel laureates [sent Xi Jinping a letter](http://www.nydailynews.com/news/world/nobel-laureates-urge-china-release-jailed-peace-prize-winner-liu-xiaobo-article-1.1213088) urging him to release Liu. Eclipsing Liu in popularity at least in the West, however, is Ai Weiwei, the famous Chinese artist and dissident. Ai Weiwei’s remarkable artistic talent made him famous in some circles, initially including the CCP and across the globe before his turn to social activism. It is undeniable, however, that [much of his popularity](http://thediplomat.com/china-power/ai-weiwei-help-floods-in/) has come from his courageous and witty challenge to Communist Party rule in China. It is this charismatic political dissent that explains why documentaries of him [win at Sundance](http://aiweiweineversorry.com/), Nicholas Kristof of the New York Times [interviews him](http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/30/opinion/sunday/kristof-hitting-china-with-humor.html?_r=0) while visiting China, and his “[Gangam Style](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=n281GWfT1E8)” parody becomes an instant You Tube sensation, despite the fact that [its underlying](http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/worldviews/wp/2012/10/24/explaining-ai-weiweis-grass-mud-horse-obsession/) political message is lost on almost all its viewers. China is hardly alone in making dissidents it persecutes famous internationally. In fact, this problem is practically inherent in authoritarian states (just ask Vladimir Putin). There’s a nearly universal tendency for people to sympathize with an “underdog” who is courageously battling a powerful force like a government, which is why a [Tunisian street vendor](http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2011/01/201111684242518839.html) setting himself on fire can spark uprisings throughout the Arab world, and David and Goliath is one of the most recognizable stories from Jewish and Christian religious texts. But this fact does not make Liu and Ai Weiwei any less damaging to the CCP’s ability to project soft power. Symbolic figures like Liu and Ai Weiwei ingrain into people’s minds the perception that the CCP is synonymous with injustice. And hardly any emotion is as universally held as the righteousness of justice, however one defines it. On a more primeval basis, people are attracted to confidence, and attempts to suppress information and dissidents creates the perception that, despite all its power and remarkable achievements, the CCP remains at its core fearful and paranoid. Few people are attracted to, much less want to emulate, those they consider fearful or paranoid. Which is why, despite China’s ancient history of soft power, and the soft power individuals like Ai Weiwei command, modern China’s soft power will remain limited under the current political leadership.

## 2AC—Security

**Linking the ballot to a should question in combination with USFG simulation teaches the skills to organize pragmatic consequences and philosophical values into a course of action**

**Hanghoj, 8** Thorkild Hanghøj, Copenhagen, 2008 Since this PhD project began in 2004, the present author has been affiliated with DREAM (Danish Research Centre on Education and Advanced Media Materials), which is located at the Institute of Literature, Media and Cultural Studies at the University of Southern Denmark. Research visits have taken place at the Centre for Learning, Knowledge, and Interactive Technologies (L-KIT), the Institute of Education at the University of Bristol and the institute formerly known as Learning Lab Denmark at the School of Education, University of Aarhus, where I currently work as an assistant professor, http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles/Files/Information\_til/Studerende\_ved\_SDU/Din\_uddannelse/phd\_hum/afhandlinger/2009/ThorkilHanghoej.pdf

Joas’ re-interpretation of Dewey’s pragmatism as a “theory of situated creativity” raises a critique of humans as purely rational agents that navigate instrumentally through meansends- schemes (Joas, 1996: 133f). This critique is particularly important when trying to understand how games are enacted and validated within the realm of educational institutions that by definition are inscribed in the great modernistic narrative of “progress” where nation states, teachers and parents expect students to acquire specific skills and competencies (Popkewitz, 1998; cf. chapter 3). However, as Dewey argues, the actual doings of **educational gaming** cannot be reduced to rational means-ends schemes. Instead, the situated interaction between teachers, students, and learning resources are played out as contingent re-distributions of means, ends and ends in view, which often make classroom contexts seem “messy” from an outsider’s perspective (Barab & Squire, 2004). 4.2.3. **Dramatic rehearsal** The two preceding sections discussed how Dewey views play as an imaginative activity of educational value, and how his assumptions on creativity and playful actions represent a critique of rational means-end schemes. For now, I will turn to Dewey’s concept of dramatic rehearsal, which assumes that social actors deliberate by **projecting** and **choosing between** various scenarios for future action. Dewey uses the concept dramatic rehearsal several times in his work but presents the most extensive elaboration in Human Nature and Conduct: Deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (**in imagination**) of various competing possible **lines of action**… [It] is an experiment in finding out what the various lines of possible action are really like (...) Thought runs ahead and foresees outcomes, and thereby avoids having to await the instruction of actual failure and disaster. An act overtly tried out is irrevocable, its consequences cannot be blotted out. An act tried out in imagination is not final or fatal. It is retrievable (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This excerpt illustrates how Dewey views the process of decision making (deliberation) through the lens of an imaginative drama metaphor. Thus, decisions are made through the imaginative projection of outcomes, where the “**possible competing lines of action” are resolved through a thought experiment**. Moreover, Dewey’s compelling use of the drama metaphor also implies that decisions cannot be reduced to utilitarian, rational or mechanical exercises, but that they have emotional, creative and personal qualities as well. Interestingly, there are relatively few discussions within the vast research literature on Dewey of his concept of dramatic rehearsal. A notable exception is the phenomenologist Alfred Schütz, who praises Dewey’s concept as a “fortunate image” for understanding **everyday rationality** (Schütz, 1943: 140). Other attempts are primarily related to overall discussions on moral or ethical deliberation (Caspary, 1991, 2000, 2006; Fesmire, 1995, 2003; Rönssön, 2003; McVea, 2006). As Fesmire points out, dramatic rehearsal is intended to describe an important phase of deliberation that does not characterise the whole process of making moral decisions, which includes “duties and contractual obligations, short and long-term consequences, traits of character to be affected, and rights” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Instead, dramatic rehearsal should be seen as the process of “crystallizing possibilities and transforming them into directive hypotheses” (Fesmire, 2003: 70). Thus, deliberation can in no way guarantee that the response of a “**thought experiment**” will be successful. But **what it can do** is make the **process** of choosing more **intelligent** than would be the case with “blind” trial-and-error (Biesta, 2006: 8). The notion of dramatic rehearsal provides a valuable perspective for understanding educational gaming as a simultaneously real and imagined inquiry into domain-specific scenarios. Dewey defines dramatic rehearsal as the capacity to stage and evaluate “acts”, which implies an “irrevocable” difference between acts that are “tried out in imagination” and acts that are “overtly tried out” with real-life consequences (Dewey, 1922: 132-3). This description shares obvious similarities with games as they require participants to **inquire into** and resolve **scenario-specific problems** (cf. chapter 2). On the other hand, there is also a **striking difference** between moral deliberation and educational game activities in terms of the **actual consequences** that follow particular actions. Thus, when it comes to educational games, acts are both imagined and tried out, but without all the real-life consequences of the practices, knowledge forms and outcomes that are being simulated in the game world. Simply put, there is a difference in realism between the dramatic rehearsals of everyday life and in games, which only “play at” or **simulate** the stakes and risks that characterise the “serious” nature of moral deliberation, i.e. a real-life politician trying to win a parliamentary election experiences more personal and emotional risk than students trying to win the election scenario of The Power Game. At the same time, the lack of real-life consequences in educational games makes it possible to design a relatively safe learning environment, where teachers can stage particular game scenarios to be enacted and validated for educational purposes. In this sense, educational games are able to provide a safe but meaningful way of letting teachers and students make mistakes (e.g. by giving a poor political presentation) and dramatically rehearse particular “**competing** possible **lines of action”** that are relevant to particular educational goals (Dewey, 1922: 132). Seen from this pragmatist perspective, the educational value of games is not so much a question of learning facts or giving **the “right” answers, but** more a question of exploring the **contingent outcomes** and **domain-specific processes** of **problem-based scenarios**.

**Predictions based off of models are accurate—our predictions are based on empirics**

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Methods Of Prediction Given the above conditions for accurate predictions, **economic events can be predicted by the use of quantitative economic models**. We will also consider the forecasting of non-repetitive or unique events. **Such events can also be forecasted if the factors affecting the outcome and the manner they affect it are corrected specified by the use of relevant economic and non-economic knowledge combined with sound judgment**. We can describe methods of prediction suitable for the two types of problems. A) Formal and quantitative. **The use of a formal model is required**. One can select a small number of important variables to make the forecast and rely on a few parameters to characterize the interactions of these variables with the variable to be forecast. The value of the parameters could be estimated by econometric methods or determined by judgment based on prior knowledge of the forecaster. Some economists build large econometric models for forecasting. I do not have such competence; I am unable to specify so many equations correctly since there may be insufficient knowledge concerning some of the equations. The estimation of a large number of parameters may give rise to inaccurate estimates given a limited set of data. Furthermore, misspecification of some equations can affect the estimation accuracy of other equations and the predictive accuracy of the entire model. Hence I will leave to others to discuss how to forecast with models much larger than the one presented in Chow (1967a), while being content to answer the question raised in the title this paper by using the examples with which I am familiar. B) Informal and qualitative. **The use of econometric models for prediction assumes that the data are generated by a stochastic process that continues to generate data in the same manner as in the past. Therefore it is applicable only to repetitive economic events**. Some economic events are not repetitive. One example is the introduction of economic reform in China in 1978. To forecast such events one cannot rely on an econometric model and statistical data to estimate its parameters, but the analytical framework is similar. The method for forecasting non-repetitive or unique historical events is more general than econometric method. Both require the selection of important variables and the specification of how the variables affect the outcome. Econometrics is a special case when the variables can be conveniently measured numerically and when their effects can be formulated in a set of mathematical equations. For example, the degree of competence of certain political leaders and the quality of the Chinese workers and entrepreneurs affected the success of China’s economic reform in the 1980’s but these variables are difficult to quantify. By assigning numbers somewhat arbitrarily to these attributes may not improve forecast accuracy. The effects of these qualitative attributes or variables need not be embedded in mathematical equations. Specifying a set of mathematical equations may not be as effective as the use of judgment concerning the combined effects of the attributes as we shall demonstrate in an example below on predicting the future of Hong Kong. The computer has not yet surpassed the human brain in processing information for making important business and political predictions. Neither can the use of mathematics.

**The alt fails and destroys minority rights—sectarian violence causes re-securitization**

**Roe, 4** – Assistant Professor, International Relations and European Studies, Central European University (Paul, “Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization,” *Security Dialogue*, Vol. 35, No. 3, September 2004)

Aradau’s (valuable) contentions aside, what I want to emphasize here is the particular understanding of securitization in terms of deconstructing identities – where the label ‘migrant’ is subordinated to other, individual identity markers. In this next section, however, what I want to show is how the deconstructivist strategy might be considered a ‘logical impossibility’ when set against the different context of protecting minority rights – that is, where, as an identity marker, the collective (the ethnic and/or the national) is necessarily considered primary. Minority Rights, Societal Security and (the Impossibility of) Desecuritization Taking a lead from Wæver, Kymlicka has also expressed a preference for desecuritization. Speaking of **minority rights**, Kymlicka notes that while in the West the claims of minorities are assessed in terms of justice, in much of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) they **are assessed in terms of security.** Moreover, the discourses of justice and security ‘pull in different directions’: security discourse effectively closes the space for minority rights to be framed in terms of justice (Kymlicka, 2001a: 1–2). Kymlicka’s claim with regard to the distinction between justice (in Western Europe) and security (in Eastern Europe) may, in itself, be contentious,4 but this is not necessarily my concern. Rather, what I would like to concentrate on is more the point that minority rights are often subject to the language of security and – this being the case – Kymlicka’s argument that the most effective strategy for enhancing minority rights in this situation is ‘to desecuritize the discourse . . . to get people to think of minority claims in terms of justice/fairness rather than loyalty/security’ (2001a: 2). I will come back to Kymlicka’s own suggested strategy for descuritization at the end of this section. But, first of all, I want to set a Huysmans-like deconstructivist approach in this very context. My starting point in thinking about this lies in Gaetano Pentassuglia’s (2003: 29) assertion that although the notion of minority rights has often been less than clearly defined, ‘the “right to identity”, going beyond the “minimalist”, physical discrimination and antidiscrimination entitlements, stands out as the overarching guarantee informing the whole notion of minority rights’. In other words, over and above all other principles, it is **the maintenance of group identity** that **underpins the provision of minority rights.** The same is also made clear in the interpretation of minority rights promoted by the OSCE’s High Commissioner for National Minorities: ‘First of all, a minority is a group with linguistic, ethnic or cultural characteristics which distinguish it from the majority. Secondly, a minority is a group which usually not only seeks to maintain its identity but also tries to give a stronger expression to that identity’ (Kemp, 2001: 30). Or, in the language of the Copenhagen School, being a minority, and thus pursuing minority rights, is a matter of ‘societal security’. In the 1993 book Identity, Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (Wæver et al., 1993), Barry Buzan’s (1991) previous five-dimensional approach to international security is reconceptualized. In addition to the five sectors of state security (military, political, economic, societal and environmental), a duality of state and societal security is also conceived: societal security is retained as a sector of state security, but it is also a referent object of security in its own right (Wæver, 1993: 25). In this new formulation, whereas, according to Wæver, state security is concerned with threats to the state’s sovereignty – if a state loses its sovereignty it will not survive as a state – societal security is all about threats to collective identity – if a society loses its identity it will not survive as a society (Wæver, 1993: 25–26). In simple terms, the Copenhagen School defines societies as politically significant ethnic, national or religious groups – collectivities that can act alongside, indeed even challenge, states in the international system. Thus, societal security concerns whatever threats bring the identity of such units into question. For Buzan, threats to societal identity can occur through the ‘sustained application of repressive measures against the expression of identity’, which can include ‘forbidding the use of language, names and dress, through closure of places of worship, to the deportation or killing of members of the community’ (Buzan, 1993: 43). In terms of defending societal identity, the Copenhagen School recognizes that ‘for threatened societies, one obvious response is to strengthen societal identity. This can be done by using cultural means to reinforce social cohesion and distinctiveness and to ensure that society reproduces itself effectively’ (Wæver et al., 1993: 191). Wæver captures the dynamic neatly, commenting that culture can be defended ‘with culture’, adding that ‘if one’s identity seems threatened . . . the answer is a strengthening of existing identities. In this sense, consequently, culture becomes security policy’ (Wæver, 1995: 68; my emphasis). Therefore, the likely response to such threats is either to safeguard the maintenance of, or to seek the restoration of, the means and practices that ensure the expression and continuity of group identity. When societal security concerns are considered within the subsequent securitization concept, the defence (maintenance/restoration) of societal identity is conceived as a discourse that is potentially available to a securitizing actor. Societal security speech acts will thus display the language of **existential threat** presented in identity terms on behalf of a collectivity (society). Securitizing actors may speak of ‘security’ itself, or instead describe threats to the identity of the group through synonyms – for example, ‘die’, ‘perish’, ‘wither’, ‘weaken’, ‘waste’, ‘decline’, and so forth. Williams notes how ‘within the specific terms of security as a speech act . . . it is precisely under the condition of attempted securitizations that a reified, monolithic form of identity is declared’ and, if this is successful, ‘[the identity’s] negotiability and flexibility are challenged, denied, or suppressed’ (Williams, 2003: 519). He continues: ‘A successful securitization of identity involves precisely the capacity to decide on the limits of a given identity, to oppose it to what it is not, to cast this as a relationship of threat or even enmity, and to have this decision or declaration accepted by the relevant group’ (Williams, 2003: 520). Securitizing within the societal sector is therefore concerned with the defining of us and them, maintaining our identity as opposed to theirs. Thus, **the language of societal security is the language of minority rights.** As such, to desecuritize in the societal sector entails that the language of maintaining collective identity be effectively **taken out of the discourse.** In Huysmans’s deconstructivist strategy, the language of the collectivity, ‘migrants’, is replaced with the language of the individual, ‘migrant’. Thus, the potential fluidity of the individual migrant’s identity provides a possible escape route from the constraints of the us–them dichotomy. In the context of minority rights, however, the necessity on the part of the minority (and indeed also the majority) for group distinctiveness necessarily **blocks this** same **way out:** the language of the individual is subordinated to the language of the collective. In other words, how is it possible to desecuritize through identity deconstruction when both minorities and majorities often strive for the reification of distinct collectivities? **To remove the language of security from the issue of minority rights**, to shift from a position of societal security to one of societal asecurity, is in essence to stop talking about group distinctiveness. In this way, it signals the death of the collectivity, of the distinct minority**.** This point is similar to that made by so-called post-structural security studies (e.g., Campbell, 1992; Klein, 1994; Shapiro, 1997), where, in terms of the state, security is not so much a function of the unit as an assertion of itself: it is ‘discourses of danger’ (Campbell, 1992) on the part of the state that are constitutive of the latter’s own identity. Commenting on David Campbell’s work, Steve Smith notes how, in this way, this identity is never fixed, and never final; it is always in the process of becoming and ‘should the state project of security be successful in terms in which it is articulated, the state would cease to exist.. . . Ironically, then, the inability of the state project of security to succeed is the guarantor of the state’s continued success’ (Smith, 2000: 95). Equally, minority rights is ‘the process of becoming’; it is an ongoing project that enables the minority to reproduce its group distinctiveness. Should its project of societal security be successful, in the sense that collective identity is no longer something that needs to be maintained, then, again, the minority will cease to exist. To restate: the **desecuritization of minority rights may** thus **be logically impossible.** This, I acknowledge, is a very strong claim to make. And although it is a claim that I wish to stick to, I do so in the knowledge of a number of important contentions. A first is that I have chosen a particular understanding of minority rights, one that ignores a more complex rendering of the situation in which political and economic insecurities are also of importance. This I accept, together with its corollary that there may be no logical impossibility at all of desecuritizing in other such situations. My approach is clearly very much contextual, and although thus relatively limited in empirical terms (to Central and Eastern Europe perhaps?), it nonetheless serves a more than useful purpose in terms of thinking conceptually about the desecuritization process. A second is that I have utilized a particular understanding of desecuritization – a Huysmans-type strategy predicated on the deconstruction of identity. Again, this is true, which is why I now want to return to Kymlicka and to what may be described as a more objectivist desecuritizing approach. Although Kymlicka is relatively unsure as to how to proceed in terms of desecuritization, he does suggest that a first step must be to grapple with the issue of territorial (political) autonomy and (possible) secession. He notes how political autonomy for minority groups might be decoupled from secession: ‘to persuade [CEE] states to put [political autonomy] on the agenda, while agreeing . . . that secession cannot be a legitimate topic of public debate or political mobilization’ (Kymlicka, 2001b: 46). But, as Kymlicka also points out, even with certain guarantees in place, CEE states have nonetheless been more than reluctant to consider claims for political autonomy, this stemming from the fear that political autonomy will naturally lead to stronger calls for secession. Kymlicka’s suggestion, though, is ‘just the opposite. I believe that democratic federalism reduces the likelihood of secession’ (Kymlicka, 2001b: 49). And here it is worthwhile quoting Kymlicka at length: We need to challenge the assumption that eliminating secession from the political agenda should be the first goal of the state. We should try to show that secession is not necessarily a crime against humanity, and that the goal of the democratic political system shouldn’t be to make it unthinkable. States and state borders are not sacred. The first goal of a state should be to promote democracy, human rights, justice and the wellbeing of citizens, not to somehow insist that every citizen views herself as bound to the existing state in ‘perpetuity’ – a goal that can only be achieved through undemocratic and unjust means in a multinational state. A state can only enjoy the benefits of democracy and federalism if it is willing to live with the risks of secession (Kymlicka, 2001b: 50). To desecuritize minority rights, then, is to accept the previously unacceptable: to open up, through democratic federalism, the **possibility of** political autonomy and **secession**; to make minority rights part of normal politics. Kymlicka’s approach here in some way seems to resemble an objectivist strategy of desecuritization. In the West, the acceptance of secession, he notes, is ‘tied to the fact that secession would not threaten the survival of the minority nation. Secession may involve the painful loss of territory, but it is not seen as a threat to the very survival of the majority nation or state’ (Kymlicka, 2001b: 50). In the East (or Central and Eastern Europe), however, the tendency is to believe that secession ‘forebodes national death’ (Bibo, in Kymlicka, 2001b: 50). The question, therefore, is how to make the case that the minority does not really represent a threat. From a Huysmans-type point of view, this kind of strategy clearly reproduces the us–them dichotomy: ‘we’ should accept, as part of being normal, that ‘they’ might not want to live with ‘us’ anymore! And this runs the risk that the minority, as with the migrant, will remain as the ‘unified cultural alien’ (Huysmans, 1995: 66). However, in order for group distinctiveness to be successfully reproduced, such a dichotomy must arguably be maintained. But, this being the case, the further risk perhaps is that the very possibility of political autonomy and secession will not only serve to reproduce the dichotomy between us and them, but will also potentially **transform this dichotomy into** one of **friend–enemy**. In other words, it threatens to (re)securitize the situation, not ‘normalize’ it. Conclusion: Towards the ‘Managing’ of Minority Rights? The assumption that more security is not always better has found a great deal of its expression in the context of migration. To frame the issue of migration in security terms is, as Huysmans describes, to see it as a ‘drama’, one ‘in which selves and others are constituted in a dialectic of inclusion and exclusion and in which this dialectic appears as a struggle for survival’ (Huysmans, 1995: 63). As a security drama, there is always the risk of violence between the natives and the aliens, and ‘there are good arguments for saying that in the present western European context that risk is relatively high’ (Huysmans, 1995: 63). The concept of desecuritization, where migration is moved from emergency politics to normal politics, where the migrant is taken out of the security drama, has thus far centred very much on the deconstruction of collective identities, where the label ‘migrant’ is subordinated to a plurality of other, more ‘everyday’ identity markers. In Central and Eastern Europe, the security drama has often been played out more in terms of minorities than in terms of migrants. But taking the minority out of the drama cannot always follow the same escape route as the migrant. Where minority rights are predicated on the maintenance of a distinct collectivity, other, everyday identity markers will remain subordinate to the ethnic/national. In these cases, therefore, a Huysmans-type deconstructivist strategy may well, as I have argued, be a logical impossibility. My conclusion in this respect thus points to the consideration of alternative ways of dealing with securitized issues: if minority rights cannot always be ‘transformed’, then perhaps they can be sometimes ‘managed’ instead. Thinking in these terms certainly reflects Wæver’s concerns with the strong self-reinforcing character of securitization in the societal sector, but does not necessarily lead to a Wæver-type conclusion that strategies should thereby be designed to ‘forestall’ emergency politics. **Management** in this sense **is about ‘moderate’** (**not excessive**) **securitization**, about ‘sensible’ (not irrational) securitization. Where societal security dilemmas occur, management is about ‘mitigating’ or ‘ameliorating’ them, not transcending them. As I alluded earlier in the article, managing the securitization of minority rights will not return the issue to normal politics in the Copenhagen School sense of it – that is to say, the situation will still be marked by the language of (societal) security. What **management can** do, however, is to ‘**normalize’ minority rights** in terms of seeking to regulate minority–majority relations **through** more **liberal democratic forms.** For such a strategy, there is the clear acceptance that both sides have genuine security concerns. As such, the strategy is to move the situation from a condition of insecurity (insufficient defence) to one of security (sufficient defence), and not from a condition of security to asecurity. The minority can feel secure when certain provisions/ legislations/mechanisms are put in place that will guarantee its existence (in identity terms), while similarly the majority can also feel secure in the knowledge that the minority will thus work (politically, economically and also societally) within the existing framework of the state. Thus, and returning to Kymlicka, the institutionalizing of a federal state structure is desirable not because it makes the possibility of political autonomy and secession something normal, but because it provides the mechanisms through which **the justification for emergency politics on both sides is reduced.**

**Realism is good and inevitable because of human nature – alternatives fail – evaluate consequences**

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**Morgenthau rooted** his **political realism in** St. Augustine’s **recognition of both the “**inevitability and the evilness of man’s lust for power**.”** 2 He repudiated **the outlook and policy prescriptions of utopians and rationalist liberals,** who, in his view, wrongly assumed that power and its hazards are attached to certain types of actions, situations, and institutions**,** and that by reforming or abolishing them**, the lust for power could be abolished and thus the moral problem for power would be thus solved. 3** Instead, Morgenthau argued that human nature **itself, rather than faulty institutions,** was responsible **for the misuse and temptations of power.** In line with this negative view of human nature, Morgenthau rejected **the tenets of the liberal strain of international relations theory, including faith in a natural harmony of interests among states, in collective security enforced by international organizations, in paciﬁsm, in peace without power, and in the simple identiﬁcation of morals and politics**. Morgenthau’s grim assessment of **man’s predicament in the political realm underpins his six principles of political realism** laid out in Politics Among Nations. These six principles also typically, but not always, form the basis for his policy prescriptions and speciﬁc criticisms of U.S. foreign policy. Morgenthau claims that “political **realism” is governed by objective laws “that have their** roots in human nature**,”** which have “not changed **since the classical philosophies of China, India, and Greece endeavored to discover these laws.”** Within those bounds, **it is the job** of realists **to assess “what the rational alternatives are from which a** statesman **may choose**.” 4 Morgenthau assumes that **statesmen think and act according to** **interests deﬁned “in terms of power,” dismissing as “futile and deceptive” clues to foreign policy that are “exclusively in the motives” or ideological preferences of statesmen**. 5 Despite insisting that the key concept of interest—defined as **power maximization**—is universally valid**,** Morgenthau concedes that the meaning of that concept depends upon the political and cultural context in which foreign policy is formulated. Nevertheless, **interest deﬁned as power remains** for Morgenthau “**the perennial standard” that directs and judges political actions.** 6 As a result, Morgenthau maintains, “**universal moral principles cannot be applied to the action of states in their abstract universal formulation, but...must be ﬁltered through the concrete circumstances of time and place**.” 7 He thus considers prudence, **the weighing of consequences of alternative political actions,** the cardinal virtue of a statesman in politics**.** 8 Morgenthau identiﬁes **interest deﬁned as power** as the measure of prudence that **saves** **us from the moral excess and political folly “of identifying the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.”** Even if nations are subject to eternal laws, Morgenthau argues, **we cannot** “**pretend to know** with certainty **what is good and evil in the relations among nations.”** **We will achieve a greater degree of justice by** moderating our moral judgment and looking at **all states**, including our own**, “as political entities pursuing their respective interests deﬁned in terms of power**.” In this way, **we are more likely to pursue “policies that respect the interests of other nations, while protecting and promoting those of our own.”** 9 Morgenthau stresses the autonomy of the political sphere from other modes of thought that a political realist must subordinate when studying the nature of politics. His theory does not claim to explain everything, but to understand “**international politics as it actually is and as it ought to be in view of its intrinsic nature, rather than as people would like to see it.”** 10 On the basis of these principles, Morgenthau concludes that **the creation of a world state overseeing perpetual peace is “unatainable under the moral, social, and political conditions in the world at our time.”** 11 Instead, he advocates **two primary methods to mitigate the inevitable struggle for power** in international politics: the **balance** of power resting **on an international consensu**s about the imperative of restraining the unbridled power aspirations of all states; **and diplomacy**, devoid of a crusading spirit, **through which states deﬁne their foreign policies** in terms of concrete conceptions of the national interest, readily compromise on issues not vital to them, and strive empathetically to view foreign policy from the point of view of other nations, not just their own. 12 The Enduring Virtues of Morgenthau Morgenthau’s version of realism has several virtues that are perilous to ignore. **He succeeds brilliantly in demolishing the fallacious assumptions underlying utopian thinking about international relations**: **faith in the moral force of public opinion, faith in the harmony of interests between states, and faith in the capacity of organizations such as the United Nations to replace the rule of force with the rule of law**. Morgenthau’s devastating refutation of the principle of collective security should be mandatory reading for those who harbor the dangerous illusion that the United Nations can serve as an adequate substitute for U.S. power and the willingness to use it. On issues of supreme national security, the **UN has failed** uĴ erly **to deter great powers from acting in their interests** for the reasons Morgenthau enunciates so persuasively. Neither the UN nor any international organization in the foreseeable future will possess the power, the consensus, or the will among its members for collective security to work. Instead, Morgenthau anticipated that the UN Security Council would generate gridlock rather than decisiveness as the major powers used the forum to pursue their clashing interests by other means. **In this environment, deterring and defeating aggression will still require** unilateral action, oĞ en in deﬁ ance of the United Nations. Morgenthau also highlights why **power is a pivotal and inescapable element of international politics**. **His ﬁercest critics must concede that even the contingent and imperfect realization of ideals in politics depends on power,** or as Reinhold Niebuhr, America’s greatest Christian realist, so aptly put it, “**There has never been a scheme of justice in history which did not have a balance of power at its foundation**.” 13 **This is equally true for the current ascendance of liberalism in international politics**, **which depends as much** on U.S. power and leadership **as on the intrinsic appeal of liberal principles**. Morgenthau’s warning against the dangers of moral messianism contains important elements of truth, as well. **History is replete with examples of statesmen wrongly conﬂating particular principles and interests into universal** ones. In many cases, moreover, messianic ideologies have served merely as a pretext or justiﬁcation to strive for power rather than an autonomous force shaping the behavior of states. Concrete conceptions of power **and interest often** **offer a** more reliable guide **for understanding international conﬂicts and prescribing their solutions.** Morgenthau’s equally prescient **warnings against the dangers of false scientism** in the study of politics **provide the intellectual ballast** for a stern and timely rebuke of neorealist theories now ascendant in the discipline of international relations. What Morgenthau would dispute is not neorealism’s correct emphasis on the structure of the international system and the distribution of capabilities within it, which he, too, considered critical variables aﬀecting the behavior of states. What he would rightly rebuke is the scientiﬁc pretension of neorealists who claim that structure is enough to explain all that is signiﬁcant about international relations. Morgenthau recoiled from the tendency, emblematic of neorealists, to treat politics as a hard science rather than a soft one. Finally, **Morgenthau identiﬁed, with great lucidity and insight, the formidable barriers to transcendent morality becoming a signiﬁcant force in foreign polic**y**.** Humans are incapable of perfection, but indeed capable of great evil and depravity, an inclination that often manifests itself more acutely and perilously among states**.** The **fog of uncertainty and the imperatives of the lust for power sometimes confound moral reasoning** and the application of moral principles to concrete circumstances. Also, Morgenthau argues persuasively, **sound moral reasoning entails not just good intentions, but a probabilistic assessment of the consequences of alternative courses of action that usually becomes clear only in retrospect.** Like ideology, universal moral principles can serve as a mere pretext for the pursuit of national policies.

**Threat rhetoric doesn’t cause war—how it’s received is key**

**Roe, 4** – Assistant Professor, International Relations and European Studies – Central European University, (Paul, “Securitization and Minority Rights: Conditions of Desecuritization,” Security Dialogue, Vol. 35, No. 3, September)

However, not all issues presented in this way will necessarily be successful; some issues may be just ‘securitizing moves’. This is explained by the fact that successful securitization is predicated on the intersubjective establishment of existential threat. As a result: The way to study securitization is to study discourse. . . . When does an argument with this particular rhetorical and semiotic structure achieve sufficient effect to make an audience tolerate violations of rules that would otherwise have been obeyed? If by means of an argument about the priority and urgency of an existential threat the securitizing actor has managed to break free of procedures or rules he or she would otherwise be bound by, we are witnessing a case of securitization (Buzan, Wæver & de Wilde, 1998: 25). Securitization is thus a kind of ‘call and response’ process: an actor makes a call that something is a matter of ‘security’, and **the audience must then respond with their acceptance** of it as such. The argument has to be framed in such a way as to achieve the level of resonance required to legitimize emergency measures. If there is no such level of acceptance, then securitization will have failed.

## 2AC—NeoLiberalism

Extinction comes first

**Bok, 88** (Sissela, Professor of Philosophy at Brandeis, Applied Ethics and Ethical Theory, Rosenthal and Shehadi, Ed.)

The same argument can be made for Kant’s other formulations of the Categorical Imperative: “So act as to use humanity, both in your own person and in the person of every other, always at the same time as an end, never simply as a means”; and “So act as if you were always through your actions a law-making member in a universal Kingdom of Ends.” No one with a concern for humanity could consistently will to risk eliminating humanity in the person of himself and every other or to risk the death of all members in a universal Kingdom of Ends for the sake of justice. To risk their collective death for the sake of following one’s conscience would be, as Rawls said, “irrational, crazy.” And to say that one did not intend such a catastrophe, but that one merely failed to stop other persons from bringing it about would be beside the point when the end of the world was at stake. For although it is true that we cannot be held responsible for most of the wrongs that others commit, the Latin maxim presents a case where we would have to take such responsibility seriously – perhaps to the point of deceiving, bribing, even killing an innocent person, in order that the world not perish. To avoid self-contradiction, the Categorical Imperative would, therefore, have to rule against the Latin maxim on account of its cavalier attitude toward the survival of mankind. But the ruling would then produce a rift in the application of the Categorical Imperative. Most often the Imperative would ask us to disregard all unintended but foreseeable consequences, such as the death of innocent persons, whenever concern for such consequences conflicts with concern for acting according to duty. But, in the extreme case, we might have to go against even the strictest moral duty precisely because of the consequences. Acknowledging such a rift would post a strong challenge to the unity and simplicity of Kant’s moral theory.

No root cause

**Larrivee, 10** – PF Economics at Mount St. Mary’s University – Masters from the Harvard Kennedy School and PhD in economics from Wisconsin, 2010 (John, A Framework for the Moral Analysis of Markets, 10/1, http://www.teacheconomicfreedom.org/files/larrivee-paper-1.pdf)

The Second Focal Point: Moral, Social, and Cultural Issues of Capitalism Logical errors abound in critical commentary on capitalism. Some critics observe a problem and conclude: “I see X in our society. We have a capitalist economy. Therefore capitalism causes X.” They draw their conclusion by looking at a phenomenon as it appears only in one system. Others merely follow a host of popular theories according to which capitalism is particularly bad. 6 The solution to such flawed reasoning is to be comprehensive, to look at the good and bad, in market and non-market systems. Thus the following section considers a number of issues—greed, selfishness and human relationships, honesty and truth, alienation and work satisfaction, moral decay, and religious participation—that have often been associated with capitalism, but have also been problematic in other systems and usually in more extreme form. I conclude with some evidence for the view that markets foster (at least some) virtues rather than undermining them. My purpose is not to smear communism or to make the simplistic argument that “capitalism isn’t so bad because other systems have problems too.” The critical point is that certain people thought various social ills resulted from capitalism, and on this basis they took action to establish alternative economic systems to solve the problems they had identified. That they failed to solve the problems, and in fact exacerbated them while also creating new problems, implies that capitalism itself wasn’t the cause of the problems in the first place, at least not to the degree theorized.

Innovation is the only sustainable path – solves the environment and decreases poverty

**Lomborg 11**

Bjorn Lomborg, directs the Copenhagen Consensus Center and is the author of The Skeptical Environmentalist and Cool It, Newsweek, June 12, 2011, "A Roadmap for the Planet", [http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/06/12/bjorn-lomborg-explains-how-to-save-the-planet.html#](http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/06/12/bjorn-lomborg-explains-how-to-save-the-planet.html)

Climate alarmists and campaigning environmentalists argue that the industrialized countries of the world have made sizable withdrawals on nature’s fixed allowance, and unless we change our ways, and soon, we are doomed to an abrupt end. Take the recent proclamation from the United Nations Environment Program, which argued that governments should dramatically cut back on the use of resources. The mantra has become commonplace: our current way of living is selfish and unsustainable. We are wrecking the world. We are gobbling up the last resources. We are cutting down the rainforest. We are polluting the water. We are polluting the air. We are killing plants and animals, destroying the ozone layer, burning the world through our addiction to fossil fuels, and leaving a devastated planet for future generations. In other words, humanity is doomed. It is a compelling story, no doubt. **It is also fundamentally wrong**, and the consequences are severe. Tragically, exaggerated environmental worries—and the willingness of so many to believe them—could ultimately prevent us from finding smarter ways to actually help our planet and ensure the health of the environment for future generations. Because, our fears notwithstanding, we actually get smarter. Although Westerners were once reliant on whale oil for lighting, we never actually ran out of whales. Why? High demand and rising prices for whale oil spurred a search for and investment in the 19th-century version of alternative energy. First, kerosene from petroleum replaced whale oil. We didn’t run out of kerosene, either: electricity supplanted it because it was a superior way to light our planet. For generations, we have consistently underestimated our capacity for innovation. There was a time when we worried that all of London would be covered with horse manure because of the increasing use of horse-drawn carriages. Thanks to the invention of the car, London has 7 million inhabitants today. Dung disaster averted. In fact, would-be catastrophes have regularly been pushed aside throughout human history, and so often because of innovation and technological development. We never just continue to do the same old thing. We innovate and avoid the anticipated problems. Think of the whales, and then think of the debate over cutting emissions today. Instead of singlemindedly trying to force people to do without carbon-emitting fuels, we must recognize that we won’t make any real progress in cutting CO2 emissions until we can create affordable, efficient alternatives. We are far from that point today: much-hyped technologies such as wind and solar energy remain very expensive and inefficient compared with cheap fossil fuels. Globally, wind provides just 0.3 percent of our energy, and solar a minuscule 0.1 percent. Current technology is so inefficient that, to take just one example, if we were serious about wind power, we would have to blanket most countries with wind turbines to generate enough energy for everybody, and we would still have the massive problem of storage. We don’t know what to do when the wind doesn’t blow. Making the necessary breakthroughs will require mass improvements across many technologies. The sustainable response to global warming, then, is one that sees us get much more serious about investment into alternative-energy research and development. This has a much greater likelihood of leaving future generations at least the same opportunities as we have today. Because what, exactly, is sustainability? Fourteen years ago, the United Nations World Commission on Environment and Development report “Our Common Future,” chaired by Gro Harlem Brundtland, provided the most-quoted definition. Sustainable development “meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” The measure of success, then, is whether or not we give future generations the same opportunities that we have had. This prompts the question: have we lived unsustainably in the past? In fact, by almost any measure, humans have left a legacy of increased opportunity for their descendants. And this is true not just for the rich world but also for developing countries. In the last couple of hundred years we have become much richer than in all previous history. Available production per capita—the amount that an average individual can consume—increased eightfold between 1800 and 2000. In the past six decades, poverty has fallen more than in the previous 500 years. This decade alone, China will by itself lift 200 million individuals out of poverty. While one in every two people in the developing world was poor just 25 years ago, today it is one in four. Although much remains to be done, developing countries have become much more affluent, with a fivefold increase in real per capita income between 1950 and today. But it’s not just about money. The world has generally become a much better educated place, too. Illiteracy in the developing world has fallen from about 75 percent for the people born in the early part of the 1900s to about 12 percent among the young of today. More and more people have gained access to clean water and sanitation, improving health and income. And according to the U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, the percentage of undernourished people in the developing world has dropped from more than 50 percent in 1950 to 16 percent today. As humans have become richer and more educated, we have been able to enjoy more leisure time. In most developed countries, where there are available data, yearly working hours have fallen drastically since the end of the 19th century: today we work only about half as much as we did then. Over the last 30 years or so, total free time for men and women has increased, thanks to reductions in workload and housework. Globally, life expectancy today is 69. Compare this with an average life span of 52 in 1960, or of about 30 in 1900. Advances in public health and technological innovation have dramatically lengthened our lives. We have consistently achieved these remarkable developments by focusing on technological innovation and investment designed to create a richer future. And while major challenges remain, the future appears to hold great promise, too. The U.N. estimates that over this century, the planet’s human inhabitants will become 14 times richer and the average person in the developing world a whopping 24 times richer. By the end of the century, the U.N. estimates we will live to be 85 on average, and virtually everyone will read, write, and have access to food, water, and sanitation. That’s not too shabby. Rather than celebrating this amazing progress, many find it distasteful. Instead of acknowledging and learning from it, we bathe ourselves in guilt, fretting about our supposed unsustainable lives. Certainly many argue that while the past may have improved, surely it doesn’t matter for the future, because we are destroying the environment! But not so fast. In recent decades, air quality in wealthy countries has vastly improved. In virtually every developed country, the air is more breathable and the water is more drinkable than they were in 1970. London, renowned for centuries for its infamous smog and severe pollution, today has the cleanest air that it has had since the Middle Ages. Today, some of the most polluted places in the world are the megacities of the developing world, such as Beijing, New Delhi, and Mexico City. But remember what happened in developed countries. Over a period of several hundred years, increasing incomes were matched by increasing pollution. In the 1930s and 1940s, London was more polluted than Beijing, New Delhi, or Mexico City are today. Eventually, with increased affluence, developed countries gradually were better able to afford a cleaner environment. That is happening already today in some of the richest developing countries: air-pollution levels in Mexico City have been dropping precisely because of better technology and more wealth. Though air pollution is by far the most menacing for humans, water quality has similarly been getting better. Forests, too, are regrowing in rich countries, though still being lost in poor places where slash-and-burn is preferable to starvation.

Violence decreasing in the status quo – Neo-lib decreases incentive for war

**Gat ‘13** (AZAR GAT, DPhil in History (University of Oxford, 1986); Ezer Weitzman Professor of National Security, Political Science Department, Tel Aviv University; recent books: War in Human Civilization (Oxford University Press, 2006); Victorious and Vulnerable: Why Democracy Won in the 20th Century and How It Is Still Imperiled (Hoover Institution, Rowman & Littlefield, 2010); Nations: The Long History and Deep Roots of Political Ethnicity and Nationalism (Cambridge University Press, 2013). Is war declining – and why? Azar Gat Department of Political Science, University of Tel Aviv azargat@post.tau.ac.il , March 19th 2013)

When quite **a number of scholars** **simultaneously and independently** of one another arrive at very similar conclusions on an **issue of cardinal theoretical and practical significance**, their thesis deserves, and has received, great attention. The thesis is that **war and violence** in general have progressively **decreased in recent times, during the modern era, and** even throughout history. Of course, despite their unanimity, all these scholars could still be wrong. Indeed, each of them tells a similar story of people’s disbelief at their findings, most notably that **we live in the most peaceful period in** human **history**. Some of them even explain the general incredulity by the findings of evolutionary psychology according to which we tend to be overly optimistic about ourselves but overly pessimistic about the world at large. Having myself written about the marked decrease in deadly human violence (Gat, 2006), I agree with the authors’ general thesis. However, their unanimity falters over, and they are less clear about, the historical trajectory of and the reasons for the decline in violence and war, questions that are as important as the general thesis itself. Previous Section Next Section Hobbes was right, and Rousseau wrong, about the state of nature Steven Pinker’s The Better Angels of Our Nature (2011) towers above all the other books surveyed here in size, scope, boldness, and scholarly excellence. It has deservedly attracted great public attention and has become a best-seller. Massively documented, this 800-page volume is lavishly furnished with statistics, charts, and diagrams, which are one of the book’s most effective features. The book, spanning the whole human past as far back as our aboriginal condition, points to two major steps in the decline of violence. The first is the sharp decline in violent mortality which resulted from the rise of the state-Leviathan from around 5,000 years ago. This conclusion is based on the most comprehensive studies of the subject published over the past 15 years (Keeley, 1996; LeBlanc, 2003; Gat, 2006), which demonstrate on the basis of anthropological and archaeological evidence that Hobbes’s picture of the anarchic state of nature as a very violent one was fundamentally true. Pinker rightly summarizes that violent mortality with the rise of states dropped from a staggering estimated 15% of the population, 25% of the men, in pre-state societies, to about 1–5%. The main reason for this drop is the enforcement of internal peace by the Leviathan, but also, less noted by Pinker, lower mobilization rates and a smaller exposure of the civilian population to war than with tribal groups, as will be explained shortly. This conclusion regarding the dramatic drop in violent mortality with the transition to the state is at odds with the claim made by Jack Levy & William Thompson in their book, The Arc of War (2011). As the book’s title implies, Levy & Thompson posit a great increase in warfare during history, before a decrease during the past two centuries. Thus, the book claims that mortality in fighting greatly increased, ‘accelerated’ in the authors’ language, with the transition to the state. They reach this conclusion by making several mistaken assumptions. First, although professing ignorance about the distant past because of the lack of evidence on the behavior of hunter-gatherer societies before the adoption of agriculture some 10,000 years ago, they cite and are heavily influenced by the old Rousseauite anthropology of the generation after the 1960s, which recent studies have refuted. Obviously, one does not have to accept the above findings regarding the pervasiveness and great lethality of prehistoric warfare. But Levy & Thompson simply do not engage with them. They accept as true the Rousseauite premise that sparse human population could not possibly have had that much to fight about. However, recently extant hunter-gatherer societies prove the opposite. Australia is our best laboratory of hunter-gatherer societies, because that vast continent was entirely populated by them and ‘unpolluted’ by agriculturalists, pastoralists or states until the arrival of the Europeans in 1788. And the evidence shows that the Australian tribes fought incessantly with one another. Even in the Central Australian Desert, whose population density was as low as one person per 35 square miles, among the lowest there is, conflict and deadly fighting were the rule. Much of that fighting centered on the water-holes vital for survival in this area, with the violent death rate there reckoned to have been several times higher than in any state society. In most other places, hunting territories were monopolized and fiercely defended by hunter-gatherers because they were quickly depleted. Even among the Inuit of Arctic Canada, who were so sparse as to experience no resource competition, fighting to kidnap women was pervasive, resulting in a violent death rate 10 times higher than the USA’s peak rate of 1990, itself the highest in the developed world. In more hospitable and densely populated environments casualties averaged, as already mentioned, 15% of the population and 25% of the men, and the surviving men were covered with scars (Gat, 2006: chs 2, 6). We are not dealing here with a piece of exotic curiosity. Ninety-five percent of the history of our species Homo sapiens sapiens – people who are like us – was spent as hunter-gatherers. The transition to agriculture and the state is very recent, the tip of the iceberg, in human history. Furthermore, the human state of nature turns out to be no different than the state of nature in general. Here too, science has made a complete turnabout. During the 1960s people believed that animals did not kill each other within the same species, which made humans appear like a murderous exception and fed speculations that warfare emerged only with civilization. Since then, however, it has been found that animals kill each other extensively within species, a point pressed on every viewer of television nature documentaries. There is nothing special about humans in this regard. Thus, lethal human fighting did not ‘emerge’ at some point in history, as Levy & Thompson posit. Previous Section Next Section Violent death sharply decreased with the rise of the Leviathan As mentioned earlier and as Pinker well realizes, violent mortality actually dropped steeply with the emergence of the state-Leviathan. Here is where Levy & Thompson make a second mistake. For measuring the lethality of warfare they use evidence of battle mortality, but this is highly misleading for various reasons. First, pre-state tribes’ main fighting modes were not the battle but the raid and the ambush – capturing the enemy by surprise and often annihilating entire sleeping camps: men, women, and children. Second, the size of battles merely indicates the size of the states and their armies, which are obviously larger than tribal groups in absolute terms. Yet the main question is relative casualties, what percentage of the population died violently. And here the fact is that while states and their armies grew by a factor of tens, hundreds, and thousands, giving a spectacular impression of large-scale fighting, relative casualties actually decreased under the state, and not only because of internal peace. Indeed, casualties decreased precisely because states grew large. Take Egypt, for example, part of the ‘acceleration’ of war with the emergence of states in Mesopotamia, Egypt, Greece, and China, according to Levy & Thompson. The size of the Egyptian army with which Pharaoh Ramses II fought the Hittite empire at the Battle of Kadesh (commonly dated 1274 BCE) was 20,000–25,000 soldiers. This was a very large army by the standards of the time. Yet the total population of Egypt was about 2–3 million, so the army constituted 1% of the population at most. This was very much the standard in large states and empires throughout history because of the great financial and logistical problems of maintaining large armies for long periods at great distances from home. Thus, in comparison to the high military participation rates of small-scale tribal societies, participation rates, and hence war casualties, in large states’ armies were much lower. Moreover, in contrast to the great vulnerability of women and children in small-scale tribal warfare, the civilian population of Egypt was sheltered by distance from the theaters of military operations and not often exposed to the horrors of war. Such relative security, interrupted only by large-scale invasions, is one of the main reasons why societies experienced great demographic growth after the emergence of the state. It is also the reason why civil war, when the war rages within the country, tends to be the most lethal form of war, as Hobbes very well realized. Warfare and feuds in the pre- and early-modern eras Levy & Thompson further posit that between the 14th and early 19th centuries, Europe was the scene of a second ‘acceleration’ in the historical trajectory of violence. This is very much in line with the prevailing perceptions regarding early modern European history, but these perceptions are most probably wrong, and for the same reason as before: Levy & Thompson count absolute battle casualties, and obviously states became more centralized during this period and armies grew in number, so battles also grew in size. Yet it was the anarchy and feudal fragmentation in Europe between the fall of the Roman Empire and 1200 that were responsible for the pervasive insecurity and endemic violence that characterized the Dark Ages and resulted in, among other things, a sharp demographic decline. Again, small-scale usually meant more, not less, violent mortality. The focus on early modern Europe is misleading also in another way: in the late Middle Ages the Mongol conquests inflicted on the societies of China, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe casualties and destruction that were among the highest ever suffered during historical times. Estimates of the sharp decline experienced by the populations of China and Russia, for example, vary widely. Still, even by the lowest estimates they were at least as great, and in China almost definitely much greater, than the Soviet Union’s horrific rate in World War II of about 15%. The receding of medieval anarchy in the face of the growing European state-Leviathans was the first step towards a steep decline in the continent’s violent mortality rate beginning in early modernity and continuing to the present day. The studies and data cited by Pinker with respect to the domestic aspect of this trend are strikingly paralleled by those of Robert Muchembled’s History of Violence (2012). The work of a historian, the book meticulously documents, on the basis of French legal records, a 20-fold decrease in homicide rates between the 13th and 20th centuries. Earlier studies of other parts of Europe, starting with Gurr (1981), have come up with similar findings. Like Pinker, Muchembled attributes the steep decline to the state’s growing authority, as its justice system effectively replaced and deterred ‘private justice’, vendetta, and pervasive violence, all of them endemic in unruly societies. Correspondingly, again like Pinker, Muchembled invokes Norbert Elias’s (2000) ‘civilizing process’, whereby the defense of honor by sword and knife, a social norm and imperative in most traditional societies, is gradually given up among both the nobility and the general populace. The civilizing process is partly a function of the growing authority of the state’s rule and justice system. But there were other factors involved, which Pinker excels in identifying and weaving together. Although he is not a historian, his historical synthesis is exemplarily rich and nuanced. He specifies the growing humanitarian sensibilities in Europe of the Enlightenment, which he traces to, among other things, the gradual improvement in living conditions, growing commercial spirit and, above all, the print revolution with the attendant values and habits of reasoning, introspection, and empathy that it inculcated among the reading elites. As Pinker points out, not only did homicide rates decline but also other previously common forms of violence, such as judicial disembowelment and torture, were becoming unacceptable by the 18th century. This was the beginning of a continuous process which during the following centuries would bring about, among other things, the abolition of slavery and the decline of capital punishment, tyranny, and political violence in the developed world – most notably in the areas where the values of Enlightenment humanitarianism triumphed. Both Pinker and Muchembled identify a change in the trend towards increased violence and homicide rates in the United States and Europe from the 1960s on. They attribute this change (Pinker is particularly elaborative here) to the erosion of public authority and some reversal of the ‘civilizing process’ with the cults of youth culture, defiance of authority, radical ideologies of violence by the ‘oppressed’, and the fragmentation of the stable family structure. Pinker identifies a return to a downward trend in violence from about 1990 on, which he attributes to an ebbing of much of the above through reasserted state action and changes in the public mood. A last point worth mentioning in this context: Muchembled reveals that throughout the steep decline in homicide rates, from medieval times to the present, 90% or more of all cases have been perpetrated by men, especially between the ages of 20 and 30 years old. As Daly & Wilson (1988: 145–149) have shown, this ratio is found in each and every society studied around the globe, from hunter-gatherers to agricultural and industrial societies, irrespective of the vastly different homicide rates among them. Previous Section Next Section The decline of war and the three `Long Peaces' after 1815 We now move to the decline of war, which is our main concern here. Most people are surprised to learn that the occurrence of war and overall mortality in war sharply decreased after 1815, most notably in the developed world. The ‘Long Peace’ among the great powers after 1945 is more recognized and is widely attributed to the nuclear factor, a decisive factor to be sure, which concentrated the minds of all the protagonists wonderfully. The (inter-)democratic peace has been equally recognized. But in actuality, the decrease in war had been very marked before the nuclear era and encompassed both democracies and non-democracies. In the century after 1815, wars among economically advanced countries declined in their frequency to about one-third of what they had been in the previous centuries, an unprecedented change. Indeed, the Long Peace after 1945 was preceded by the second longest peace among the great powers, between 1871 and 1914, and by the third longest peace, between 1815 and 1854 (Gat, 2006: 536–537, 608). Thus, the three longest periods of peace by far in the modern great powers system all occurred after 1815. Clearly, one needs to explain the entire trend, while also accounting for the glaring divergence from it: the two World Wars. Previous Section Next Section Is modern war more lethal and destructive than before? In his earlier works, Levy (1983) was among the first to document the much-reduced frequency of war after 1815. But what brought about this change? Levy & Thompson assume – this is perhaps the most natural hypothesis – that wars declined in frequency because they became too lethal, destructive, and expensive. Supposedly, a trade-off of sorts was created between the intensity and frequency of warfare: fewer, larger wars supplanting many smaller ones. This hypothesis barely holds, however, because, again, relative to population and wealth wars have not become more lethal and costly than earlier in history. Furthermore, as Levy & Thompson rightly document, the wars of the 19th century – the most peaceful century in European history – were particularly light, in comparative terms, so there is no trade-off here. True, the World Wars, especially World War II, were certainly on the upper scale of the range in terms of casualties. Yet, as already noted, they were far from being exceptional in history. Once more, we need to look at relative casualties, general human mortality in any number of wars that happen to rage around the world, rather than at the aggregate created by the fact that many states participated in the World Wars. I have already mentioned the Mongol invasions, but other examples abound. In the first three years of the Second Punic War, 218–16 BCE, Rome lost some 50,000 citizens of the ages of 17–46, out of a total of about 200,000 in that age demographic (Brunt, 1971). This was roughly 25% of the military-age cohorts in only three years, the same range as the Russian and higher than the German rates in World War II. This, and the devastation of Rome’s free peasantry during the Second Punic War, did not reduce Rome’s propensity for war thereafter. During the Thirty Years War (1618–48) population loss in Germany is estimated at between one-fifth and one-third – either way higher than the German casualties in World War I and World War II combined. People often assume that more developed military technology during modernity means greater lethality and destruction, but in fact it also means greater protective power, as with mechanized armor, mechanized speed and agility, and defensive electronic measures. Offensive and defensive advances generally rise in tandem. In addition, it is all too often forgotten that the vast majority of the many millions of non-combatants killed by Germany during World War II – Jews, Soviet prisoners of war, Soviet civilians – fell victim to intentional starvation, exposure to the elements, and mass executions rather than to any sophisticated military technology. Instances of genocide in general during the 20th century, much as earlier in history, were carried out with the simplest of technologies, as the Rwanda genocide horrifically reminded us. Nor have wars during the past two centuries been economically more costly than they were earlier in history, again relative to overall wealth. War has always involved massive economic exertion and has been the single most expensive item of state spending (e.g. massively documented, Bonney, 1999). Examples are countless, and it will suffice to mention that both 16th- and 17th-century Spain and 18th-century France were economically ruined by war and staggering war debts, which in the French case brought about the Revolution. Furthermore, death by starvation in premodern wars was widespread. Previous Section Next Section Is it peace that has become more profitable? So if wars have not become more costly and destructive during the past two centuries then why have they receded, particularly in the developed world? The answer is the advent of the industrial–commercial revolution after 1815, the most profound transformation of human society since the Neolithic adoption of agriculture. The correlation between the decline of war in the developed world and the process of modernization, both unfolding since 1815, is surely not accidental, and the causation is not difficult to locate. In the first place, given explosive growth in per capita wealth, about 30- to 50-fold thus far, the Malthusian trap has been broken. Wealth no longer constitutes a fundamentally finite quantity, and wealth acquisition progressively shifted away from a zero-sum game. Secondly, economies are no longer overwhelmingly autarkic, instead having become increasingly interconnected by specialization, scale, and exchange. Consequently, foreign devastation potentially depressed the entire system and was thus detrimental to a state’s own wellbeing. This reality, already noted by Mill (1848/1961: 582), starkly manifested itself after World War I, as Keynes (1920) had anticipated in his criticism of the reparations imposed on Germany. Thirdly, greater economic openness has decreased the likelihood of war by disassociating economic access from the confines of political borders and sovereignty. It is no longer necessary to politically possess a territory in order benefit from it. Of the above three factors, the second one – commercial interdependence – has attracted most of the attention in the literature. But the other two factors have been no less significant. Thus, the greater the yield of competitive economic cooperation, the more counterproductive and less attractive conflict becomes. Rather than war becoming more costly, as is widely believed, it is in fact peace that has been growing more profitable. Referring to my argument in this regard, Levy & Thompson (2011: 72–75) excused themselves from deciding on the issue on the grounds of insufficient information regarding the cost of premodern war. But as already noted, the information on the subject is quite clear.

Neoliberalism key to space colonization

**Shakouri, 13** has an LL.M. in international law and is based in Tehran (Babak Shakouri “Space settlements on the Moon and elsewhere will create new legal issues” 4/1/13 http://www.thespacereview.com/article/2269/1) //NG

**Once human settlements on nearby celestial bodies are established, their commercial exchanges with Earth will become an issue**. Space migrants who choose to leave Earth and settle in an uncomfortable concrete or metal base on the Moon or Mars must have very strong incentives to step forth for such breathtaking adventure**. There seems to be no greater reward than the lucrative economic opportunities found in a settlement on an alien surface full of potential resources.**¶ The positive **economic exchange rate with the Earth may assure the continuation and even expansion of space settlements on celestial bodies. Otherwise, settlers either will depend on equipment and reinforcements from Earth or go bankrupt. This may shed light on the importance of adopting** suitable **legal regime for human space settlements that,** on one hand, fuels **the needed investments for establishment of space settlements and,** on the other hand, **helps the efforts of inhabitants those settlements flourish economically and leads ultimately to their self-sufficiency.**¶ **There is sufficient evidence** to suggest **that the legal framework of a free market economic system incredibly suits the requirements of human settlements in space, since freedom of business and market innovation, together with recognition of private property, are the key elements in making** the **humans** the first known **spacefaring** intelligent species.¶ Finally, the matter of the administrative legal regime of space settlements is another noteworthy issue to be considered. This matter, which is mainly categorized within the realm of administrative law, has attracted less attention in comparison with other legal aspects of outer space activities, but in no way should its importance and impact on future space settlement be disregarded.

Extinction – we have to go to space

**Garan, 10** – Astronaut (Ron, 3/30/10, Speech published in an article by Nancy Atkinson, “The Importance of Returning to the Moon,” http://www.universetoday.com/61256/astronaut-explains-why-we-should-return-to-the-moon/)

Resources and Other Benefits: **Since we live in a world of finite resources and the global population continues to grow, at some point the human race must utilize resources from space in order to survive. We are already constrained by our limited resources, and the decisions we make today will have a profound affect on the future of humanity. Using resources and energy from space will enable continued growth and the spread of prosperity to the developing world without destroying our planet.** Our minimal investment in space exploration (less than 1 percent of the U.S. budget) reaps tremendous intangible benefits in almost every aspect of society, from technology development to high-tech jobs. **When we reach the point of sustainable space operations we will be able to transform the world from a place where nations quarrel over scarce resources to one where the basic needs of all people are met and we unite in the common adventure of exploration.** The first step is a sustainable permanent human lunar settlement.

## DipCap

**Kerry has no influence, and his agenda is directed by Obama**

**Debusmann 13** (Bernd, former Reuters foreign affairs columnist, 4-19-13, “Kerry and the peace process .. Can he be the honest broker” The Daily Star) http://www.nosratashraf.com/en/content/21806

In practice, **Kerry’s first three visits to the region as secretary of state – Turkey, Israel and the West Bank – produced no clear signs that the administration of** President Barack **Obama is rethinking its relationships with the protagonists in the conflict – or its tendency to shrug off Israeli actions** that run counter to official American policy and international law, such as building Israeli settlements in the West Bank and East Jerusalem. While there were no expectations for immediate results, the Kerry visits served to underscore the limits of U.S. influence in the region. In Istanbul, Kerry stressed that “Turkey can be a key, an important contribution to the process of peace in so many ways.” One of those ways, he explained, would be to help revive the ailing economy of the West Bank, another to create a climate of peace in Gaza, the Hamas-run coastal strip that often is the elephant in the room in discussions about the conflict. Both Israeli and Palestine Authority officials poured cold water on Turkey’s possible insertion into the peace process. **Kerry was equally unsuccessful in trying to persuade Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas to keep in place Prime Minister Salam Fayyad, the U.S.-educated former World Bank economist whose drive to build institutions for a future Palestinian state drew more praise from the U.S. than from Palestinians.** The two leaders had been at loggerheads and despite a phone call from Kerry, Abbas accepted Fayyad’s resignation on April 14. Kerry appears undaunted by such setbacks. He plans more visits to the Middle East in the next few months. Before that, an Arab League delegation is due in Washington on April 29 to discuss a peace proposal first introduced by Saudi Arabia in 2002 and later adopted by an Arab League summit in Beirut. The plan offered full Arab recognition of Israel in exchange for territory it captured in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. Israel rejected the proposal but the Arab League re-endorsed it five years later. Whether the initiative, in its original form or with changes, has better prospects of being accepted now than it had then is open to doubt. **How much time and diplomatic capital Kerry can spend on reviving something that has been more process than peace for two decades ultimately depends on Obama, who firmly directed foreign policy in his first term. Major decisions were shaped in the White House, not the State Department, something not likely to change in Obama’s second term.**

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## DipCap

Kerry’s failing in the squo

AP 6/22 (NewsMax Uncredited, Kerry Struggles to Deliver on Big Promises, 6/22/13, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsfront/Kerry-Big-Diplomacy/2013/06/22/id/511327?s=al&promo\_code=13EB4-1)//LA

Signaling a shift from the cautious approach of Obama's first term, Kerry announced his first trip abroad would focus on changing Assad's belief that he could prevail militarily and on pushing him into eventually relinquishing power. Since then, however, the fighting has only gotten worse. Thousands more have died as Assad firmed his grip over much of the country and the U.S. hasn't even delivered all the nonlethal aid Kerry promised Syria's rebels, let alone any of the weapons or ammunition that Obama recently authorized. Having failed to reshape the war, Kerry changed strategy by going to Moscow to re-launch a peace process for Syria that Clinton engineered in June 2012 but had been all but forgotten in the months since. In Moscow, Kerry boasted that the former Cold War foes just accomplished "great things when the world needs it" by deciding to convene an international conference, perhaps by the end of May, that would include Syria's government and opposition. That conference has been delayed until at least July, and maybe August, and it might never come off at all given the opposition's refusal to negotiate while it is losing land to Assad and getting so little help from the United States and other Western powers. That failure falls directly on Kerry, who as part of the U.S.-Russian approach was tasked with delivering the opposition to the bargaining table. Russia may have lived up to its end of the bargain by guaranteeing the Assad government's attendance at any future peace conference. But Putin and the Kremlin also have been undermining peace efforts by sending more weapons to help the Syrian government's counteroffensive. Kerry's one-man diplomacy in Syria is in some ways emblematic of his tenure. Officials say he opted to revive the U.S.-Russian strategy for a Syrian transitional government during his walk in the backyard of a Moscow guesthouse with Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, informing aides only after of his decision. Afterward, he insisted he wasn't simply rewinding the clock by a year because the U.S. and Russia were now going to find ways to put the plan in place. More than two months later, there has been no progress.

**No Israel strikes**

**Kam**, PhD IR – Harvard, deputy director – Institute for National Security Studies, **‘11**

(Ephraim, “A Green Light on Iran?” Strategic Assessment Vol. 13, No. 4, January)

The question is, which of the threats would military action seek to address? If there is sufficient basis to the assessment that Iran is liable to attack Israel with nuclear weapons, then military action can be weighed as a means to prevent an extreme danger on this level. However, if the basic assumption is that Iran would not launch a nuclear strike against Israel but that Israel would be required to confront threats of the second level, **it is doubtful they would justify military action** and convince other countries of the necessity of the action. Though important and significant threats, they are not existential, and Israel could cope with them. It is true that in the past Israel conducted many military actions and also went to war in order to remove threats that were not necessarily existential. But the problematic nature of military action against Iran and the exceptional risks it involves, as well as the US administration’s reservations, raise doubts as to whether it would be correct to take such action, if its entire goal would be to confront the second level threats.

**No escalation**

**Fettweis**, Asst Prof Poli Sci – Tulane, Asst Prof National Security Affairs – US Naval War College, **‘7**

(Christopher, “On the Consequences of Failure in Iraq,” *Survival*, Vol. 49, Iss. 4, December, p. 83 – 98)

Without the US presence, a second argument goes, nothing would prevent Sunni-Shia violence from sweeping into every country where the religious divide exists. A Sunni bloc with centres in Riyadh and Cairo might face a Shia bloc headquartered in Tehran, both of which would face enormous pressure from their own people to fight proxy wars across the region. In addition to intra-Muslim civil war, cross-border warfare could not be ruled out. Jordan might be the first to send troops into Iraq to secure its own border; once the dam breaks, Iran, Turkey, Syria and Saudi Arabia might follow suit. The Middle East has no shortage of rivalries, any of which might descend into direct conflict after a destabilising US withdrawal. In the worst case, Iran might emerge as the regional hegemon, able to bully and blackmail its neighbours with its new nuclear arsenal. Saudi Arabia and Egypt would soon demand suitable deterrents of their own, and a nuclear arms race would envelop the region. Once again, however, **none of these outcomes is particularly likely.** Wider war No matter what the outcome in Iraq, **the region is not likely to devolve into chaos.** Although it might seem counter-intuitive, by most traditional measures the Middle East is very stable. Continuous, uninterrupted governance is the norm, not the exception; most Middle East regimes have been in power for decades. Its monarchies, from Morocco to Jordan to every Gulf state, have generally been in power since these countries gained independence. In Egypt Hosni Mubarak has ruled for almost three decades, and Muammar Gadhafi in Libya for almost four. The region's autocrats have been more likely to die quiet, natural deaths than meet the hangman or post-coup firing squads. Saddam's rather unpredictable regime, which attacked its neighbours twice, was one of the few exceptions to this pattern of stability, and he met an end unusual for the modern Middle East. Its regimes have survived potentially destabilising shocks before, and they would be likely to do so again. The region actually experiences very little cross-border warfare, and even less since the end of the Cold War. Saddam again provided an exception, as did the Israelis, with their adventures in Lebanon. Israel fought four wars with neighbouring states in the first 25 years of its existence, but none in the 34 years since. Vicious civil wars that once engulfed Lebanon and Algeria have gone quiet, and its ethnic conflicts do not make the region particularly unique. The biggest risk of an American withdrawal is intensified civil war in Iraq rather than regional conflagration. Iraq's **neighbours will likely not prove eager to fight each other** to determine who gets to be the next country to spend itself into penury propping up an unpopular puppet regime next door. As much as the Saudis and Iranians may threaten to intervene on behalf of their co-religionists, they have shown no eagerness to replace the counter-insurgency role that American troops play today. If the United States, with its remarkable military and unlimited resources, could not bring about its desired solutions in Iraq, why would any other country think it could do so?17 Common interest, not the presence of the US military, provides the ultimate foundation for stability. All ruling regimes in the Middle East share a common (and understandable) fear of instability. It is the interest of every actor - the Iraqis, their neighbours and the rest of the world - to see a stable, functioning government emerge in Iraq. If the United States were to withdraw, increased regional cooperation to address that common interest is **far more likely than outright warfare.**